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“CLIENTLESS” LAWYERS
Russell M. Gold *
Abstract: Class counsel and prosecutors have a lot more in common than scholars realize.
These lawyers have clients, but their clients are diffuse and lack a formal decisionmaking
structure. Because of the nature of their clients, class counsel and prosecutors have to make
decisions for their clients that one would ordinarily expect clients to make—and indeed that
legal ethics rules would expressly require clients to make in other contexts—such as
decisions concerning objectives of representation or whether to settle or plead guilty. Both
complex litigation and criminal law scholars recognize that these lawyers’ self-interests
diverge from their clients’ interests. But the complex litigation and criminal law literatures
discuss the ensuing accountability problem solely in their own spheres. This article considers
the insights about accountability that complex litigation can learn from criminal law.
More specifically, the article argues that although there are real differences between the
two systems, these differences do not justify the completely different approaches to
accountability that the two contexts employ. Rather, the comparison suggests that internal
checks within class counsel’s firm, between plaintiffs’ firms, or between third-party funders
and class counsel can improve accountability, much as internal checks improve
accountability within some prosecutors’ offices.
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INTRODUCTION
Clients control the objectives of representation and core decisions
such as whether to go to trial or resolve a case through a settlement or
guilty plea. 1 Usually. In some types of cases, however, the client is a
diffuse group with no decisionmaking structure, so the lawyers have to
make the essential decisions about how best to protect the client. The
two most studied instances of “clientless” 2 lawyers are class counsel and
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). I do not mean to suggest
that lawyers play a trivial role in these decisions. To the contrary, a lawyer’s advice about a
proposed settlement is important to the client’s decision. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency
Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 214 (1987) (“The attorney will always—or almost
always—know much more about the lawsuit than the client. The attorney’s advice about the merits
of a proposed settlement will often weigh heavily in the client’s decision.”); William H. Simon,
Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 217 (1991) (“Even
where they think of themselves as merely providing information for clients to integrate into their
own decisions, lawyers influence clients by myriad judgments, conscious or not, about what
information to present, how to order it, what to emphasize, and what style and phrasing to adopt.”).
2. I call them “clientless” because, as a practical matter, these lawyers can largely operate as
though they are clientless. Nonetheless, I use the quotation marks because I contend that it is
important for even these “clientless” lawyers to remain faithful to their diffuse clients.
To be clear, I do not mean that these lawyers are clientless in the same sense as lawyers who lack
actual clients but serve in important committee roles in multidistrict litigation, as other scholars
have used this term. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 151 (2010)
(employing “clientless” in that context).
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prosecutors. 3 Although the roles of class counsel and prosecutors are
certainly not identical, they share core unrecognized similarities: diffuse
clients, complicated client interests, and self-interested lawyers. 4 There
are certainly differences between the criminal and class action contexts.
But class counsel and prosecutors are similar in the ways that matter for
considering how to hold lawyers accountable to their clients when the
clients cannot do so themselves. 5
Both complex litigation literature and criminal law literature
separately recognize that vesting self-interested lawyers with the power
to control litigation without the opportunity for meaningful client
monitoring creates substantial accountability concerns. 6 Class counsel
and prosecutors both have entity-clients whose members, by and large,
are apathetic about the litigation. Class action scholars have widely
recognized this apathy, 7 and there is no reason to think that most
3. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677–78 (1986) (explaining that it is well understood in class actions that
clients have only a nominal stake and that clients do not in fact define litigation objectives);
R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Support Sentencing
Reform, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 981, 992 (2014) (“Because the prosecutor represents society at large,
she has no personal client to direct her course of action, and must make decisions about what is in
the best interests of the sovereign that ordinarily would be entrusted to a client. This unique role of
both principal and agent requires the prosecutor to pursue the public interest, rather than simply
pursue a conviction.”); Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV.
69, 71 (2011) (explaining that prosecutors must make decisions about what best serves the client’s
interests). Government litigation fits this category too but is not the emphasis of this article.
4. See infra Part I.
5. This article focuses on damages class actions under Rule 23(b)(3). Cf. David Marcus, The
Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777 (2016) (explaining why institutional reform
litigation for injunctive relief warrants different treatment from damages class actions). Lawyers’
potential conflicts of interest are also quite different in civil rights cases than damages suits. See,
e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 963 (2009) (“Prosecutors are agents who imperfectly serve their principals (the
public) . . . .”); Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in
Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561, 578 (2014) (“The major class action cases of the
past fifteen years have returned time and again to the problem of how to ensure the faithfulness of
the class representatives to the interests of the passive class members who lack the ability or
incentive to monitor the litigation activities of those who act on their behalf. This theme unifies the
disparate technical questions presented in cases from Amchem and Ortiz over a decade ago, to WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and Smith v. Bayer more recently.”).
7. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 288, 305 (2010) (describing “rational apathy” of “many small claimants”); Samuel
Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3165, 3171
(2013) (describing “‘rational apathy’ of the [class members] to expend huge effort to monitor
developments” in their case).
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members of the prosecutor’s client—the public as a whole 8—care (or
even know) much about outcomes of individual criminal cases (save for
victims and defendants about their own cases or the occasional highprofile case). 9
Because of this disconnect between lawyer and client and the inability
of a diffuse entity-client to monitor the lawyer in any traditional sense,
both systems seek to restrain the lawyer’s authority in some fashion to
ensure faithfulness to her client’s interests. 10 These two bodies of
scholarship and doctrine have, however, largely marched along without
pausing to notice how the other system deals with a similar problem. 11
That comparative analysis begins in earnest here, focusing on what
complex litigation doctrine can learn from accountability scholarship in
criminal law. 12
Perhaps unsurprisingly, because of the lack of comparative analysis to
this point, the monitoring regimes that aim to control these lawyers in
the two systems are quite different. Class counsel are monitored largely
through judicial review while prosecutors, at least formally, are
monitored through the ballot box. 13 The primary insight of criminal law
scholarship on prosecutor accountability is that elections and other
mechanisms external to prosecutors’ offices are largely ineffective.
8. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015)
(“The prosecutor generally serves the public and not any particular government agency, law
enforcement officer or unit, witness or victim.”); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias,
Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 861–62 (2004) (“The prosecutor has a client in an
abstract sense—she represents the ‘public’ or the ‘state’ . . . .”).
9. See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 137–38 (2002) (“[T]he public is generally not aware of most
murder trials in the United States, let alone any significant portion of the verdicts in other criminal
cases.”); Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 610 (2014)
(describing “the entire electorate” as typically showing “collective disinterest” in the work of its
prosecutors); cf. Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining From the Ground Up: Accuracy and
Fairness Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1076 (2016) (explaining that
plea bargaining expedites process so much that it precludes public participation).
10. See infra Part II.
11. The notable exception is one portion of an excellent article that discusses an analog to
presentence investigations for class settlement fairness review. See William B. Rubenstein, The
Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1442 (2006).
12. Infra Part III; cf. David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without
Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO.
L.J. 683 (2005) (calling for more comparative work between civil and criminal procedure while
explaining their core similarities). In other work I consider what criminal law can learn from
complex litigation about accountability. See Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Prosecutors, 51 GA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017).
13. In theory, grand juries and petit juries also check prosecutors, but neither works particularly
well. See infra section II.B.
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Thus, the best people to restrain prosecutors are not voters but other
prosecutors. 14 That insight about a turn to monitoring by the lawyer’s
colleagues can helpfully apply in the class action context.15
In damages class actions, most victims are largely apathetic about
their small-value claims. 16 Accordingly, while class members may offer
their views regarding the adequacy of their lawyer and the fairness of a
proposed settlement, they cannot actually control or fire their lawyer. 17
Rather, because there is no reason to expect that the class-client will
directly monitor its lawyer, class action law turns to judges to monitor
the lawyer-client relationship. Judicial monitoring in class actions is not
perfect, however. Docket pressures and informational deficits pose
barriers to review. Assigning a judge to monitor class counsel is a
reasonable solution, but there are structural reasons to doubt its
effectiveness and thus look elsewhere for monitoring. 18 And here the
core insight from criminal law proves instructive.
Class action law too could turn to a lawyer’s colleagues and look
within the plaintiffs’ bar to supplement judicial monitoring. Such
monitoring could come from within individual firms, between plaintiffs’
firms, and between third-party funders and class counsel. I do not
suggest mandating internal review or prescribing a particular form.
14. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) (advocating greater attention to supervision
in federal prosecutors’ offices and separating adjudication and enforcement as tasks to be done by
different actors to check prosecutor overreach); Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in
3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1123, 1137, 1147, 1152 (2012) (finding that some
offices assign different prosecutors to handle each procedural phase of a case and that offices vary
substantially as to how much consultation prosecutors do with colleagues while prosecutors in other
offices view themselves as independent contractors assigned to their roster of cases).
15. See infra Part III.
16. E.g., Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1442 (“Class members’ passivity and absence is expected;
indeed it provides much of the justification for aggregate treatment of their claims in the first
place.”).
17. See Lazy Oil v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 584, 588–91 (3d Cir. 1999). Individual class
members can opt out and pursue their claim individually, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v), but most
certified class actions involve claims that are sufficiently low-value that they cannot feasibly be
pursued individually. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The
realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as
only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”) (emphasis omitted).
18. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1445 (describing judges’ “remarkable information
deficit” when reviewing class settlements); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 805, 829 (1997) (describing judges’ self-interest in clearing cases from their
dockets); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 46 (1991) (explaining that judges are conditioned to view negotiated resolutions of litigation
favorably).
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Rather, courts should incentivize review within firms and allow those
firms to make their own implementation choices. Courts could do so by
predictably and transparently decreasing attorney’s fees in cases where
class counsel had previously proposed a settlement that was rejected as
unfair to the class or where the deal that class counsel secured for the
client is not particularly good. Courts reviewing class settlements could
also consider class counsel and her firm’s track record in previous cases.
Both approaches would create profit incentives for law firm partners
who are not working on a case to ensure that their colleagues have
gotten a good enough deal for the client.
In sum, this article argues that comparing class actions and criminal
prosecution can offer useful lessons because class counsel and
prosecutors share certain key similarities that create similar
accountability problems. The comparison suggests that internal checks
within class counsel’s firm, between plaintiffs’ firms, or between thirdparty funders and class counsel can improve accountability, much as
criminal law scholars have explained about internal accountability
within prosecutors’ offices.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the core
similarities between class counsel and prosecutors that make the
comparison worthwhile. Part II then considers the different monitoring
regimes that the two systems use to hold these lawyers accountable.
Lastly, Part III considers what class action law can learn from criminal
law regarding holding these “clientless” lawyers accountable to their
clients.
I.

“CLIENTLESS” CONCERNS

The core similarity between class counsel and prosecutors is what I
call their “clientless” nature. Both are lawyers with diffuse clients
comprised primarily of individuals who are apathetic about their cases
and therefore cannot be expected to monitor their lawyers directly. 19
Both clients have complex and amorphous goals that require difficult
balancing, which necessarily falls to their lawyers. 20 Nonetheless, as
scholars have widely recognized with class counsel and prosecutors, the
lawyers have powerful self-interests at play that may diverge from the

19. I do not mean to suggest that comparing class counsel and prosecutors is more useful than
comparisons of other “clientless” lawyers and plan to expand the frame of the comparison in future
work.
20. See infra sections I.A–I.B.
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clients’ interests. 21 Thus, for those concerned about these lawyers acting
as faithful agents for their clients, 22 it is important to find effective
means of monitoring and checking these lawyers. Sections A through C
of this Part explore these three core similarities between class counsel
and prosecutors that give rise to substantial accountability concerns and
call for some other source of agent monitoring: (a) diffuse clients, (b)
amorphous interests, and (c) self-interested lawyers. Finally, Section D
explains why the resulting accountability deficits are problematic in both
contexts.
A.

Diffuse Entity-Clients

Both class counsel and criminal prosecutors represent diffuse groups
that lack a decisionmaking structure.23 In both instances, most of the
members of these groups are apathetic as to the outcome of each case. 24
1.

Class Counsel

Whom class counsel should represent is a source of some
disagreement, 25 but I assume the approach embodied in the current

21. See infra section I.C.
22. One reason for that commitment is the basic idea that lawyers are agents who should always
faithfully represent their clients. Other reasons why observers of class action law and criminal
prosecution should care about lawyer faithfulness to the client are addressed below. See infra
section I.D.
23. Contrast the nature of these representations with representing a more traditional entity-client
such as a corporation that has a board of directors and formal decisionmaking processes.
24. Securities class actions with large institutional investors may be an exception, but these large
investors have no great incentive to both remain in and control the litigation. See UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD CIRCUIT, FINAL REPORT: THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON SELECTION
OF CLASS COUNSEL 94 (2002), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/final%20report%20of
%20third%20circuit%20task%20force.pdf [https://perma.cc/25EP-6F97] (“[I]t is the exceptional
class action (not the rule) to find a lead plaintiff who has suffered a loss that would financially
support an individual suit, yet who prefers to prosecute a class action, taking on fiduciary duties to
others and incurring the delay and expense of all the attendant procedures.”) [hereinafter THIRD
CIRCUIT TASK FORCE REPORT]; James D. Cox et. al., Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1602 (2006)
(“[F]ew financial institutions seek to so involve themselves, presumably because they do not see
that the rewards of doing so are sufficient to offset the cost of becoming involved.”)
25. Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 379–80 (2000) (arguing that
monetary damages class actions are merely aggregation devices and that class counsel owes
individual duties to the class members), with David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party
and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 924 (1998) (embracing description of class as an entityclient, much like a corporation).
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version of Rule 23, in which class counsel should represent the interests
of her class-client as a whole. 26
Others argue that class counsel should aim, at least in part, to serve as
a private attorney general and promote overall public welfare rather than
the interests of the particular class. 27 Private class actions provide an
important private enforcement mechanism that supplements limited
governmental enforcement resources. 28 But my view is that class
counsel should represent her class-client’s best interests, and in so doing,
her work may generate incidental but important public benefit. 29
Under either view of whom class counsel should represent, class
counsel represents a diffuse entity and thus must make the critical
decisions about what course of action to take. 30 Unlike the traditional
model in which the client holds ultimate authority over the decision of
whether to settle a case and on what terms, 31 class counsel can settle
claims over the objection of the named plaintiffs or absent class
members so long as the court finds that the proposed settlement is fair. 32

26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (2003) (explaining that “the obligation of
class counsel [is] to represent the interests of the class, as opposed to the potentially conflicting
interests of individual class members”); see, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions:
Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass
Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (“Class action lawyers are duty-bound to represent
the interests of the particular class . . . .”).
27. See William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why It Matters,
57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2132 (2004) (arguing that class counsel has responsibilities to both the
class and the public that vary in relative degree based on the case); cf. Myriam Gilles, Class
Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL
L. REV. 305, 308–09 (2010) (contrasting the “public law” conception of the class action as
promoting broad social goals such as deterrence with the “private law” view that prioritizes
compensation).
28. See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 720 (1940).
29. Erichson, supra note 26, at 25 (“In contrast to the duties of government lawyers, private class
counsel owe a duty of loyalty to the members of the particular class.”); Martin H. Redish, Class
Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public
Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 86 (2003) (“[W]hatever impact federal adjudication may have on
the public interest must come as an incident to the assertion and adjudication of narrower, personal
interests.”).
30. Coffee, supra note 3, at 677–78; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1695 (2008); Deborah L. Rhode, Class
Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1982).
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
32. See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 584, 588–91 (3d Cir. 1999). The notion that
class counsel can settle claims over the objections of absent class members is built into the structure
of the rule that allows for objectors’ voices to be heard in a public fairness hearing before a judicial
decision on the proposed settlement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2), (e)(5).
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Prosecutors

Prosecutors’ responsibilities to their clients are particularly
complicated. They are tasked with serving their clients’ interests as other
lawyers are, 33 but the nature of their clients—their populaces as a
whole 34—and their oath to uphold the Constitution complicate that
charge. 35 Serving the public does not mean seeking to maximize
convictions or sentences. 36 Similarly, although prosecutors are tasked
with considering victims’ interests,37 victims are not prosecutors’
clients. 38 Rather, prosecutors’ role is to assure that justice is done 39
because justice is their public-clients’ objective in criminal law.40
Except in its most obvious dimensions such as not convicting the
innocent, 41 however, saying that the prosecutor should do justice
answers very little. 42 The duty to do justice entails “specific obligations
33. Russell M. Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1591, 1642
(2014); Gold, supra note 3, at 75–80.
34. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, § 3-1.3 (“The prosecutor generally serves
the public and not any particular government agency, law enforcement officer or unit, witness or
victim.”); Green & Zacharias, supra note 8, at 861–62 (“The prosecutor has a client in an abstract
sense—she represents the ‘public’ or the ‘state’ . . . .”).
35. Prosecutors’ duties to the public and their oath to protect and defend the Constitution are not
satisfied with simple adherence to majority will. Rather, what the majority actually wants plays an
important role in what prosecutors should do, but the prosecutor should not always be a majoritarian
actor. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, § 3-1.2(b) (“The primary duty of the
prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.”).
36. Id. (“The prosecutor serves the public interest and should act with integrity and balanced
judgment to increase public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of appropriate
severity, and by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal charges in appropriate
circumstances.”).
37. For federal prosecutors, see Justice for All Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2012).
38. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, § 3-1.3; Green & Zacharias, supra note 8,
at 861 (“[P]rosecutors are independent in that they, not the police or the victims, are the ultimate
decision-makers.”).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A prosecutor has
the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, § 3-1.2(b) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice
within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.”).
40. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (1976) (“For though the attorney for the
sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his
client’s overriding interest that ‘justice shall be done.’”); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors
“Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 642 (1999) (explaining that the identity of the
prosecutor’s sovereign client is the clearest source of prosecutors’ obligation to “seek justice”).
41. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, § 3-1.2(b) (“The prosecutor should seek to
protect the innocent and convict the guilty . . . .”).
42. See R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 638 (2006); Green,
supra note 40, at 618.
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to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice”43 and that the
defendant is treated fairly. 44 It requires prosecutors to “think about the
delivery of criminal justice on a systemic level” rather than focusing
only on seeking individual convictions. 45 Because the prosecutor’s duty
to do justice is rooted in the notion of serving the public-client’s interest,
I have argued elsewhere that prosecutors’ enforcement priorities should
track their citizenry’s preferences. 46 Such an approach would more
effectively balance the complex array of their public-clients’ interests in
criminal justice. 47 Deciding what particular course of action best serves
the public’s interest in each case is left to the prosecutor. 48 This idea that
prosecution should seek to track the public interest explains the
Nineteenth Century shift from private prosecution by victims to public
prosecutors in America. 49
3.

Similarity

Because of the diffuse nature of their clients, both class counsel and
prosecutors ultimately must decide for themselves what course of action
best serves the clients’ interests, including deciding whether to go to trial
or on what terms to settle a dispute. Victims’ views play some role in

43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); accord
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, § 3-1.2(b) (the prosecutor should “respect the
constitutional and legal rights of all persons, including suspects and defendants”).
44. Green, supra note 40, at 642.
45. Cassidy, supra note 3, at 983.
46. Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment, supra note 33, at 1642; Gold, supra note 3, at
75–80; see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the
Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 203 (2008) (“[P]rosecutors should not
make decisions in individual cases according to what is popular, resource-allocation and other
politically-controversial judgments (e.g., whether to prosecute marijuana use) can [legitimately] be
informed by what citizens in the jurisdiction believe is appropriate”). For instance, even if the public
may wish for a prosecutor to pursue charges in a particular case against a disfavored defendant, she
may nonetheless pursue such charges only if she concludes that they are supported by probable
cause. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
47. See infra section I.B.
48. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3 (“The public’s
interests and views are should be [sic] determined by the chief prosecutor and designated assistants
in the jurisdiction.”); see Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2124–29 (1998) (describing effect of not having a traditional client on
prosecutor’s role).
49. Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV.
183, 213–14 (2014); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution
Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 411, 432–33 (2009) (describing history of shift
to public prosecution); Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in the NineteenthCentury United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43, 43 (1995) (same).
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both contexts, but in neither case do the victims’ views bind the
decisionmaker as they would in a traditional lawyer-client relationship.50
Prosecutors can charge and pursue cases against victims’ wishes, 51 and
class counsel can settle cases over the objection of the class
representatives with judicial approval. 52 Neither client can fire its
lawyer. 53
Under the class-interest model assumed here, 54 class counsel should
represent the interests of the class as a whole—a diffuse aggregate
client—rather than the individual class members. 55 The identity of their
clients is not exactly the same as prosecutors’ public-clients. But class
counsel, like prosecutors, are the ones calling the shots and making the
key decisions on behalf of their clients who cannot voice their own
interests.
Under the private attorney general model of class actions, 56 the
parallel is closer. Both lawyers represent the public.
B.

Complex Client Interests

In neither class actions nor criminal law is the lawyer’s task of
figuring out what best serves the client’s interests a straightforward one.
Scholars who argue that class counsel should pursue the class’s best
interests typically focus primarily on class counsel maximizing victim
compensation. 57 Scholars who take a social welfarist view of class
counsel typically focus on deterrence as the primary objective that class
actions should achieve. 58 Both focuses are too narrow, even given their

50. See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 584, 588–91 (3d Cir. 1999); Green &
Zacharias, supra note 8, at 861.
51. See, e.g., 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.1(a) (4th ed. 2016) (“state
courts have viewed these various victims’ rights provisions as not limiting the prosecutor’s charging
discretion and not as conferring upon victims any right to judicial review of the exercise of that
discretion”).
52. See Lazy Oil, 166 F.3d at 584, 588–91.
53. Voters as a whole can periodically throw out their lead prosecutor (if fortune strikes and the
incumbent is opposed), but they cannot fire their lawyer to change course in a particular case.
54. See supra section I.A.1.
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B) advisory committee’s notes (2003).
56. See supra section I.A.1.
57. Gilles, supra note 27, at 308–09.
58. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 785 (8th ed. 2011) (“[W]hat is
most important from an economic standpoint is that the violator be confronted with the costs of his
violation—this preserves the deterrent effect of litigation—not that he pay them to his victims”);
Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social
Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105 (2006) (“All that matters” in small-
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premises. The class is typically well-served when defendants are forced
to internalize externalities and when firms know that there is a sufficient
fee incentive for private lawyers to enforce consumer, securities,
employment, and other laws. 59 Class actions can also serve the
important, albeit less widely recognized, social functions of generating
information and drawing attention to allegations of wrongdoing that tend
to help both class members and the broader public. 60 Lastly, defendants
settling and therefore ceasing to dispute allegations will look to some—
class members included—as tacitly admitting wrongdoing even when
defendants purport to deny wrongdoing in the settlement agreements.61
And that tacit admission may be psychologically valuable to some. In
this article, I do not aim to discuss these sometimes-competing interests
in any detail but simply seek to explain that determining the class’s
interests is not a straightforward exercise in getting as much money for
the class members as possible. The complication arises because of
interests like information generation and attention drawing and because
deterrence turns less on how much money goes to class members versus
other recipients like lawyers than on aggregate payouts. 62
Scholarship theorizing the aims of criminal law seeks to flesh out
what a theory of justice should seek to accomplish and thus provides
some large-scale objectives that prosecutors’ public-clients desire.
Criminal law seeks deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation,

claim class actions “is whether the practice causes the defendant-wrongdoer to internalize the social
costs of its actions.”).
59. See Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1093–95 (2012)
(explaining that deterrence is an individual entitlement of plaintiffs because it helps them avoid
harm).
60. See Russell M. Gold, Compensation’s Role in Deterrence, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1997,
2044–47 (2016); Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1055, 1057 (2015) (explaining in the context of informational benefits to defendants that “lawsuits
can unearth information about misconduct that organizations have hidden from regulators and the
public at large”); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 605 (1997) (explaining that litigation can
bring damaging facts to light and that “if the public learns about the defect, perhaps people can take
precautions to reduce harm”).
61. See Gold, supra note 60.
62. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
2043, 2060 (2010) (explaining that total amount defendant has to pay determines deterrent effect);
Gilles & Friedman, supra note 58, at 105–06 (same). But see Gold, supra note 60 (arguing that
reputational deterrence is greater if victims are typically compensated in class actions than if they
are not). More deeply exploring the interests of diffuse clients in various types of cases will have to
be left for another day.
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and restitution or some other benefit for victims. 63 There is nothing
simple, straightforward, or value-neutral about weighing these different
considerations and determining how best to resolve each case in light of
them. 64 Each prosecutor’s constituents may weigh these objectives
differently and indeed may weigh them differently in each case, and
each constituency is far from monolithic or homogenous in its
interests. 65 Thus, even for the best-intentioned, most publicly oriented
prosecutor, deciding how best to serve these various objectives in each
case through charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing
recommendations is a tall order.
Although the clients’ interests across the class action and criminal law
contexts are different, sometimes they are more similar than people
might realize. 66 In criminal law, prosecutors are tasked with considering
victims’ interests and seeking restitution on their behalf, 67 which is a
private-law concern that looks a lot like tort law. 68 And indeed, the
scope of restitution in criminal law can be so large that it looks
63. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 325
(2004); see also Gold, supra note 3, at 81; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a
Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 50 (1998) (referring to “maximum deterrence” as the
public’s interest in criminal law enforcement).
64. See Gold, supra note 3, at 81; Green, supra note 40, at 634 (“It is the prosecutor’s task, in
carrying out the sovereign’s objectives, to resolve whatever tension exists among them in the
context of individual cases.”).
65. See Bibas, supra note 6, at 982 (“Some prosecutors and some citizens emphasize retribution,
while others may care more about deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. . . . The aggregation
of stakeholders’ views will never be an elegant equation . . . .”); Green & Zacharias, supra note 8, at
867 (“Different constituencies of individual prosecutors, and constituencies of prosecutors in
different jurisdictions, inevitably have diverging views . . . .”); Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 65 (“To
minimize the social cost of crime, the prosecutor cannot simply attempt to minimize the total
number of crimes; she must evaluate the harm associated with each offense and determine the mix
of prosecutions that will minimize the total quantum of harm.”).
66. This is because, as David Sklansky and Stephen Yeazell have persuasively argued, criminal
law is not purely public law nor is civil litigation purely private law. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra
note 12, at 697–703; see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–87
(1984) (arguing that the purpose of adjudication is not merely private dispute resolution and that
settlement brings only peace for the parties and not necessarily justice in a broader sense).
67. Justice for All Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5)–(6) (2012); Adam S. Zimmerman &
David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1385, 1393 (2011) (“Similarly,
while prosecutors do not formally represent victims as private attorneys do in a civil case, Congress
has charged prosecutors to seek victim input and recover restitution on their behalf.”).
68. I do not mean to suggest that the label or the stigma of a criminal conviction does not matter.
Rather, the point is that the same concerns animate criminal restitution as civil relief.
Although the parallel to civil litigation is not quite as pure, efforts at restorative justice in criminal
law also show deep concern with the private-law aspects of criminal law because they focus on
relations between the victim and perpetrator. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 12, at 701–02,
738.
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remarkably similar to aggregate litigation. 69 Adam Zimmerman and
David Jaros refer to such cases as “criminal class actions.” 70 They point
to examples of prosecutors’ efforts to secure $1.4 billion in restitution
over side effects from Zyprexa, a fund to distribute assets seized from
Bernie Madoff, and a $225 million restitutionary fund set up to
compensate shareholders of Computer Associates for inflating earnings
reports. 71
Much as criminal law shares the private-law concern about restitution,
so too does aggregate litigation share public-law concerns such as
deterring wrongdoing. Creating a procedure that allows for victims to be
compensated even when their individual claims are small is a privatelaw concern underlying class actions. 72 But the primary social-welfarepromoting function of class actions and the primary reason to award
attorney’s fees to encourage such suits is deterring wrongdoing. 73 They
protect the public from future harm by forcing companies to internalize
externalities and prevent companies from avoiding the threat of liability
by spreading harm thinly across a large group. 74
Class counsel and prosecutors’ clients’ interests are not identical, and
the comparison does not work in every respect. One important difference
is the degree of internal conflicts of interests within the client group that
the two systems permit. Let us again leave aside prosecutors’ attempts
(or obligations) to secure restitution for groups of victims. In the
remainder of their work, prosecutors’ public clients are composed of
victims, defendants, and disinterested members of the public whose
views on the correct amount of criminal enforcement and their priorities
within that enforcement vary widely. 75 Class actions, on the other hand,
cannot be certified if the putative class contains sufficiently important

69. See Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 67, at 1398.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1387–88.
72. See, e.g., Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not
economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small
individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they
may employ the class-action device.”); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974)
(recognizing that petitioner could not recover anything on his $70 claim without a class action).
73. See POSNER, supra note 58, at 785; Gilles & Friedman, supra note 58, at 105.
74. Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. ACT, Inc., 798 F.3d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 982 (2016); see also supra note 58.
75. Green & Zacharias, supra note 8, at 866 (“A nonpartisan prosecutor must at least consider the
interests of all her constituencies in some fashion, including those of the defendant.”).
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internal conflicts, including conflicts between current and future
victims. 76
While the Supreme Court has required increasing similarity between
class members in the past two decades, 77 classes can nonetheless still be
certified with internal conflicts as to the core decisions that clients would
be asked to make in individual litigation. For example, individual clients
decide whether to settle. 78 But class members likely have varying risk
tolerances, discount rates for recovery, levels of animosity toward the
defendant for conduct related or unrelated to the lawsuit, desires for
public acknowledgement of wrongdoing, desires for information
regarding the underlying conduct, and desires to continue a relationship
with the defendant. At least a few class members demonstrate these
different preferences in many cases by actively opposing some
settlements. All of these factors substantially affect preferences for quick
settlement, a protracted battle with extensive discovery, a case litigated
to judgment or resolved by explicit admission, or whether information
and acknowledgements of wrongdoing would be better traded for cash.
But these differences do not preclude certification. 79 Moreover, scrutiny
of intraclass conflicts is weakened by courts’ incentives to clear their
dockets, particularly in settlement class actions where a settlement is
proposed concurrently with the motion for class certification. 80
Thus, both systems task lawyers with balancing competing objectives
on behalf of a client that is (albeit to different degrees) internally divided

76. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 858 (1999); Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling
Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 707 (2013) (explaining that the focus of the Court’s
concerns over class action governance is “that there are no structural allegiances of class counsel
that would create incentives to favor one part of the class over another, or be biased against seeking
the best possible return to a defined subset of claims.”).
77. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
651, 687 (2014) (“[I]t appears that courts have required a stronger degree of cohesiveness for (b)(2)
classes after Amchem.”); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
729, 774 (2013) (“The Supreme Court’s Dukes decision appears to have given new meaning to
commonality.”); see also D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation,
66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1186 (2013) (“[T]he class action has become less and less practical for
resolving many types of large-scale aggregate litigation . . . .”).
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
79. For plaintiffs whose views on these issues are very strongly (perhaps irrationally) held, the
ability to opt out and pursue their own case helps accommodate these interests. But opting out to
pursue one’s own case is a big step to take when individual claim values are small. See Carnegie v.
Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[O]nly a lunatic or a fanatic sues for
$30.”).
80. See Issacharoff, supra note 18, at 829; Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 45–46; Richard A.
Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 968 (1996); Rubenstein,
supra note 11, at 1445.
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about the objectives and how best to pursue them in each case. Civil
litigation often poses difficult questions about risk aversion and
settlement, how much money is enough, and how extensively to use
discovery tools. In individual litigation, clients get to decide on
questions about settlement preferences, both as a matter of ethical rules 81
and good practice. 82 In aggregate litigation and criminal prosecution,
these decisions fall to lawyers. Internal conflicts are less pronounced in
class actions than in criminal prosecution, but that difference in degree
does not detract from the value of comparing the two systems for
monitoring these clientless lawyers.
C.

Self-Interested Lawyers

Both complex litigation literature and criminal law literature
recognize that there are substantial reasons to be concerned that these
“clientless” lawyers’ interests will diverge from their clients’.
1.

Class Counsel

Class action scholars widely recognize the potential disconnect
between class counsel’s interests and the class’s.83 Class counsel has her
own pecuniary interest in the litigation, which can lead to the conflict. 84
Both typically want to be paid, but that can be the full extent of the
congruence of interests. Most scholars worry that class counsel will
under-reach and sell out the class’s claims too cheaply or after
expending too little effort. 85 The concerns arise because class counsel

81. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
82. When seeking repeat business, it makes good sense to leave clients feeling like they are
deciding key questions.
83. The scholarship deems these “agency costs.” See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The
Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (1995) (“No opening
generalization about the modern class action is sounder than the assertion that it has long been a
context in which opportunistic behavior has been common and high agency costs have prevailed.”);
Nagareda, supra note 80, at 931 (“The problem in the class action context is that ‘the negotiator on
the plaintiffs’ side, that is, the lawyer for the class, is potentially an unreliable agent of his
principals.’ This is, in other words, a classic illustration of an agency cost problem . . . .” (quoting
Mars Steel v. Continental ill. Natl. Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677,681 (7th Cir. 1987))).
84. See, e.g., Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protection for the Class and
the Case for Reform, 73 NEB. L. REV. 646, 657–58 (1994) (“Invariably direct conflicts arise
between class counsel, the class, and its representatives with respect to attorneys’ fees, settlement,
fee sharing, and other issues.”); Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 22 (“Unfortunately, there is a
substantial deviation of interests between attorney and client.”).
85. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 529, 536 (1978) (explaining that the class is best served when its lawyer devotes a
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fronting the costs of litigation will tend to make class counsel more risk
averse than the client and because the opportunity cost of pursuing new
cases might seem greater than additional dollars earned from fighting
harder in an existing case. 86 That “sell-out” or “sweetheart” settlement
may be in exchange for the certainty of recovery or the defendant’s
agreement not to object to an attorney’s fee request.87
Morris Ratner argues that the traditional model of class counsel’s
incentives accurately reflects the practice in very small firms but not in
the larger firms that dominate today’s plaintiffs’ class action bar. 88
Ratner explains that an accurate account of lawyers’ interests must
account for firm structure and whether the person managing the
litigation will personally bear the risk of funding the litigation, how
much control she has over directing firm resources, and how much of
her compensation and promotion depends on the success of the case. 89
Under his model, lawyers controlling class action litigation may seek to
maximize something other than the class’s well-being because their
compensation or reputation may be tied in some measure to the success
of the case, but they may be far less risk-averse than is conventionally
assumed because they do not individually bear all of the financial risk. 90

large number of hours to ensure maximum recovery but that class counsel is better served when she
works a smaller number of hours).
86. Id. at 543–46 (explaining that a contingency fee creates an incentive for class counsel to shift
her time to other matters before the client would wish because of the lawyer’s opportunity cost)
Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer
Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1042 (2002) (“even when a trial would increase the
net recovery for class members, class counsel can maximize its rate of return by avoiding trial and
settling early” because class counsel fronts litigation costs with no guarantee of recovery).
87. William D. Henderson, Clear Sailing Agreements: A Special Form of Collusion in Class
Action Settlements, 77 TUL. L. REV. 813, 815 (2003); see also Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v.
Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2011) (“We and other courts have often remarked
the incentive of class counsel . . . [to] agree[] with the defendant to recommend that the judge
approve a settlement involving a meager recovery for the class but generous compensation for the
lawyers . . . .”); Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 908 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., concurring) (“It
is unlikely that a defendant will gratuitously accede to the plaintiffs’ request for a ‘clear sailing’
clause without obtaining something in return. That something will normally be at the expense of the
plaintiff class.”). Because these “clear-sailing” agreements create the potential for an unholy
alliance, they must now be disclosed as part of seeking judicial settlement approval. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(e)(3).
88. See Morris Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs’ Class Action Attorneys, 31 REV. LITIG. 757,
774 (2012) (“[L]arger firms have in fact come to dominate the plaintiffs’ class action bar.”).
89. Id. at 783.
90. Id. at 790–91.
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Other scholars worry that class counsel will file “strike suits”—
meritless claims filed just to secure an attorney’s fee. 91 But the usual
concern with strike suits is about filing socially inefficient litigation. 92
Strike suits are unlikely to impair the class’s interests in a meaningful
way. Any certified class action will extinguish the rights to sue of all
individual class members who do not opt out; 93 but these claims are
meritless by hypothesis, and thus extinguishing them does not constitute
a great loss to the class members. Leaving aside securities cases, there
may be some cost to class members to the extent that litigation costs
from meritless suits result in higher prices. But that transfer would be
difficult to measure and presumably would depend on price elasticity of
demand. Moreover, if the strike suit generates small payments to class
members, those small payments may offset any price increases. There is
more reason for concern about overreach impairing the class’s interests
in securities class actions where the concern is that these cases simply
impose costs on shareholders without benefit because these shareholders
are—at least indirectly—on both sides of the “v.” 94
2.

Prosecutors

Similarly, there is reason to think that prosecutors’ self-interest does
not perfectly align with their constituents’ interests,95 and prosecutorial

91. Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1442 (“[C]lass counsel may do too much, filing meritless cases
in the hopes of extracting nuisance fees (a strike suit).”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability
and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why “Exit” Works Better than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 407, 410 & n.9 (2008) (explaining the concept of a “strike suit”).
92. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053,
2084 (1995) (“Other critics make a similarly disturbing claim: that plaintiffs’ attorneys
automatically file frivolous class actions—which they term ‘strike suits’—whenever a public
company’s stock declines by more than ten percent during some brief period. This, they argue, has
led to an ‘explosion’ of frivolous class action litigation.”).
93. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, When Peace Is Not the Goal of A Class Action Settlement, 50
GA. L. REV. 475, 477 (2016).
94. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 100 (2011); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class
Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1535–36
(2006). But see Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 812–13 (2009) (refuting pocket-shifting critique).
95. See Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 50 (“For prosecutors, day-to-day motivations include
numerous considerations different from and often incompatible with the public’s interest in
maximum deterrence.”); see, e.g., Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 1447, 1464–87 (2016) (describing prosecutors’ self-interests in maintaining relationships with
police that will prove helpful in future cases but cut against the public’s interest in police-officer
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discretion is vast. 96 Prosecutors have career-driven self-interests that
favor creating splashy headlines, being viewed as tough on crime, and
pleading out cases as quickly and easily as possible.97 Moreover,
because of the nature of their work, prosecutors “ordinarily are naturally
aligned with the police and victims.” 98 But because these two groups are
only small components of prosecutors’ aggregate clients, these
affiliations may exacerbate the disconnect between prosecutors’ actions
and the public-client’s best interests. 99 Each of these points warrant more
detailed analysis.
The chief prosecutor in most local offices is elected. 100 Her strongest
self-interested motivation is to remain in office and then perhaps to use
the office as a pathway to higher executive branch office or a
judgeship. 101 Thus, she has to be concerned with her reputation and
political standing. 102 Perhaps it could be said that just doing her job well
would best protect her office, but given the widespread criticisms of
prosecutor elections, that seems misguided. 103 Rather, lead prosecutors
accountability). The focus of this article is on prosecutors’ charging, plea, and other pre-trial
decisions where they remain far from the purely adversarial cauldron of trial.
96. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 6, at 959, 963; Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a
Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 300–01 (1983); Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective
Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 605, 647 (1998)
(“Criminal defendants in this country almost never win on claims that prosecutors acted with
racially discriminatory purpose in bringing a charge.”).
97. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 8, at 857 (“[A]ll prosecutors inevitably have a reputational
interest in all their cases . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
98. Id. at 863 (emphasis omitted).
99. See id. at 866 (“A nonpartisan prosecutor must at least consider the interests of all her
constituencies in some fashion, including those of the defendant.”); H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral
Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1695,
1697 (2000) (“Neutrality, I will suggest, puts the prosecutor in the position of advocate for all the
people—including the person against whom the evidence has been accumulating.”).
100. Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 589
(2009).
101. Jed Shugerman, The Prosecutor-Politicians 2 (May 5, 2015) (on file with author) (“[T]he
office of prosecutor has become a stepping stone to higher office in America.”); see also Stephanos
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2462, 2472 (2004)
(“Prosecutors are particularly concerned about their reputations because they are a politically
ambitious bunch.”). I do not mean to imply that remaining in office is necessarily more important to
every lead prosecutor than doing justice by her constituents, but rather to explore the import of the
conscious or unconscious tug of prosecutors’ self-interests.
102. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1987 (1992);
Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 50–51; William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,
100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 535 (2001) (“District attorneys are likely to seek to manage their offices in
ways that win them public support.”).
103. See Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 1987. For more on the problems of prosecutor elections,
see infra section II.B.
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have a strong interest in being viewed as tough on crime. 104 That label
seems less essential than it did a decade ago, 105 but it is far safer than a
contrary label. Accordingly, lead prosecutors best assure their chances of
reelection if they ensure a high conviction rate and avoid high-profile
losses; 106 these factors are far more immediate and easily measurable
than considering whether a prosecutor’s office has balanced goals of
protecting the public, deterring future wrongdoing, retribution,
rehabilitation, restitution, and easing reentry to her constituents’
liking. 107 Similarly, locking up a lot of people (in raw numbers and not
just proportional to the number charged) also helps support a story about
being tough on crime. And the more easily cases are resolved, the more
cases prosecutors can bring with the same fixed budget, which creates a
strong incentive to favor frequent early plea bargains. 108
Line prosecutors have their own self-interests. 109 They tend to want
their bosses to be reelected because it serves their own employment
104. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 61 (1998) (“Like most politicians, prosecutors view ‘tough on crime’ themes
as the most effective tools to assure re-election.”); Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It?
The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of
(Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 29 (1997) (“The epithet ‘soft on crime’ is the
contemporary equivalent of ‘soft on Communism.’”). Criminal justice interest groups also line up
much more heavily on the side of increased punishment. Brown, supra note 63, at 330–31.
105. David Alan Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship Between Prosecutors and Democracy in
the United States (revised version forthcoming in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS
NATIONAL STUDY (Maximo Langer & David Alan Sklansky eds. 2017)) (manuscript at 4),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2829251 [https://perma.cc/2EMN-L6BZ] (“If winning a race for District
Attorney by promising less incarceration would have been ‘unthinkable in an earlier era,’ it is not
unthinkable today.” (quoting Leon Neyfakh, How to Run Against a Tough-on-Crime DA—and Win,
SLATE (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/11/district_
attorneys_scott_colom_proves_you_can_run_against_a_tough_on_crime.html [https://perma.cc/3L
98-6452])); see, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The “Smart on Crime” Prosecutor, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 905 (2012) (describing criminal justice reforms to reduce incarceration, among other ways
to save money in the criminal justice system).
106. See Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 67, at 1399 (“Politically ambitious prosecutors may
prioritize a rapid resolution and big headlines at the expense of victims’ different interests in
compensation.”).
107. Green & Zacharias, supra note 8, at 902–03 (“[T]he public tends to overemphasize the
measurable or obvious aspects of what prosecutors do . . . .”); Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 1987
(explaining why deterrent effects of prosecutors’ policies are less powerful to a prosecutor’s
political standing than the factors mentioned above the line); Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 50–51
(same); e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 2017) (describing “successful and productive
reentry and reintegration into society” as one component of “insur[ing] the public safety”); see also
Justice for All Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (listing just punishment, deterrence,
protection of the public as some of the objectives of criminal sentencing).
108. Brown, supra note 49, at 194–207; Stuntz, supra note 102, at 536–37.
109. See Bibas, supra note 6, at 996 (“Line prosecutors, however, also serve their own strong
self-interests in racking up marketable win-loss records, making names for themselves, and
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prospects, 110 which makes their elected boss an important person to
placate. But electoral pressures do not carry as much weight for line
prosecutors as for lead prosecutors. 111 Line prosecutors may also be
looking to secure a position in private practice later and thus are best
served to be viewed as tough prosecutors with high conviction rates,
though they might be more willing than their bosses to try cases to gain
trial experience. 112 That said, trying cases that have a substantial risk of
losing unnecessarily jeopardizes the prosecutor’s reputation for purposes
of seeking a promotion or private-sector employment. 113 Moreover,
prosecutors naturally have reason to want to lighten their workloads, 114
which tends to favor quick pleas rather than trials. 115 Thus, other than a

lightening their own workloads.”); Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 51 (“[U]nderlying the agency
problems between chief prosecutor and the public is an additional layer of agency problems
between the chief and his assistants.”).
110. See Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 369, 373–74 (2010) (explaining that lead prosecutors might fire line prosecutors who damage
their reelection prospects); Gold, supra note 3, at 73 & n.21; Stuntz, supra note 102, at 535 (“To
some degree, line prosecutors will seek to [maximize political support] too, because that is their
bosses’ goal, and they must satisfy their bosses in order to keep their jobs.”).
111. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 46, at 202–03 (“The chief prosecutor may be influenced
by an illegitimate self-interest in reelection or political advancement in those situations where
lower-level prosecutors would be less affected by those interests.”); Schulhofer, supra note 102, at
1987 (“Front-line prosecutors who actually negotiate plea agreements may or may not share the
District Attorney’s desire to enhance the office’s political stature.”).
112. See Bibas, supra note 6, at 961–62 (“They are tempted to try a few strong or high-profile
cases to gain marketable experience while striking hurried plea bargains in most other cases.”);
Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 443 (2009)
(line prosecutors “also would like to gain trial experience and to feel the thrill of the chase”);
Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal
Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627, 629 (2005) (explaining that data regarding future career
opportunities of federal prosecutors supports the notion that people choose to be Assistant United
States Attorneys to gain trial experience); Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide
Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1602 (2010) (“In the United
States, by contrast, it is more common for new prosecutors to leave the office after a few years for
other (often more lucrative) positions, either in criminal defense or in civil litigation.”).
113. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 921–22 (2006) (“Plea bargains guarantee certainty of conviction and punishment. In
exchange for certainty, risk-averse prosecutors sacrifice severity to avoid possible acquittals that
could embarrass them and hurt their career prospects.”); Bibas, supra note 6, at 996 (“Line
prosecutors, however, also serve their own strong self-interests in racking up marketable win-loss
records . . . .”).
114. See Stuntz, supra note 102, at 535 (“Like most of us, line prosecutors are likely to seek to
make their jobs easier, to reduce or limit their workload where possible.”).
115. Bibas, supra note 6, at 961–62; see also Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal
Procedure, supra note 113, at 913 (“While they may share the public’s intuitions about justice and
retribution, they also have self-interests in disposing of large caseloads quickly, reducing their own
workloads, rewarding cooperative behavior, and ensuring certainty of conviction and sentence at the
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slightly more risk-seeking approach to trying cases, line prosecutors’
interests tend to bear substantial similarity to lead prosecutors’ interests
in keeping conviction numbers and rates high.
These pressures for both lead and line prosecutors cut in favor of
resolving the vast majority of cases through quick plea bargains using
whatever powerful leverage is available to garner that result. Such an
approach tends to cut against the public’s interest in fair procedures for
defendants 116 and may impose substantial hidden costs on the public fisc
such as incarceration costs. 117
The accountability story is somewhat different for federal
prosecutors. They are politically checked by being accountable to an
elected president, but that check is far more distant than in state offices
where the elected official is much closer on the organizational chart.
Thus, the political pressures to keep conviction stats high are less potent,
at least to appease their current bosses. But federal prosecutors tend to
be a particularly ambitious group of people who may use the office as a
launching pad. 118 Preserving a perception of toughness helps.
For state and federal prosecutors alike, civil forfeiture creates
financial self-interest for prosecutors, albeit not as direct of a financial
incentive as for some class action lawyers. 119 Federal law provides for
wide-reaching forfeiture of assets related to a crime in some manner. 120

cost of severity.”); Brown, supra note 49, at 194 (describing several possible uses of efficiency
improvements such as faster and more prevalent plea bargaining).
116. Gold, supra note 33, at 1643–44 (arguing that the minister of justice duty includes protecting
citizens’ constitutional rights); Green, supra note 40, at 634 (minister of justice duty means
“avoiding punishment of those who are innocent of criminal wrongdoing . . . and affording the
accused, and others, a lawful, fair process”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 1983) (explaining that prosecutors have a “specific obligations to see that the defendant
is accorded procedural justice”).
117. Gold, supra note 3, at 80–82 (explaining that costs such as incarceration are not publicly
transparent).
118. See supra note 101.
119. See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 853, 863 (2014) (“It is true that public enforcers do not profit from successful litigation in the
sense of taking home a percentage of awards, as private lawyers might. Nevertheless, the
institutional structures in which many public enforcers work provide ample incentives for salaried
government employees to prioritize and maximize financial recoveries.”).
120. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) (2012) (listing a substantial
number of crimes that can trigger forfeiture of assets with some relationship to the crime including
offenses such as making false statements, mail fraud, and altering or removing motor vehicle
identification numbers); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s
Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 45–50 (1998). Congress recently expanded the
list to encompass human trafficking. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-22, § 105(b), 129 Stat. 227, 237 (2015).
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Forfeited proceeds at the federal level go into a Department of Justice
Asset Forfeiture Fund that is then allocated for the DOJ’s use in
numerous ways. 121 In such a scheme, the DOJ naturally has an incentive
to maximize forfeitures to aggrandize its budget. 122 Encouraging
forfeiture was why Congress allowed the DOJ to keep its proceeds. 123
Individual prosecutors share this institutional incentive to increase
forfeiture for a couple of reasons. 124 First, if DOJ directives encourage
more forfeitures to bolster the agency’s budget, 125 individual
prosecutors’ performance evaluations and job retention may be based at
least in part on how effectively they secure forfeited assets. 126 Second,
the agency’s reputation may be bolstered by substantial forfeiture
numbers, 127 and employees prefer to work for organizations with strong
reputations. 128 States can pursue their own forfeitures but have

121. See Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)
(2012) (listing wide range of authorized uses for forfeited funds).
122. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 120, at 56 (“The most intuitively obvious problem
presented by the forfeiture and equitable sharing laws is the conflict of interest created when law
enforcement agencies are authorized to keep the assets they seize. It takes no special sophistication
to recognize that this incentive constitutes a compelling invitation to police departments to stray
from legitimate law enforcement goals in order to maximize funding for their operations.”).
123. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 119, at 868 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 191 (1983)).
124. Id. at 895 (“Our theory suggests that, in many cases, the individuals responsible for public
enforcement will share their employers’ institutional interest in building the agencies’ budget or the
agencies’ reputation through financial penalties.”).
125. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 120, at 63 (DOJ “has regularly exhorted its attorneys to
make ‘every effort’ to increase ‘forfeiture production’ so as to avoid budget shortfalls”).
126. See Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines
Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture After United States v. Bajakajian,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461, 509–10 (2000) (“[T]o the extent that policymakers in the Justice
Department and in Congress view the quantity of forfeited assets as an indicator of prosecutorial
effectiveness, lower-ranking officials have a powerful incentive to pursue forfeiture aggressively.”).
For similar metrics in police departments, see Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 120, at 65 (“[W]hen
a police department relies on a steady stream of forfeiture income to pay for its operations, as many
now do, an officer’s choice of who and what to target may mean the difference between a paycheck
and a pink slip.”).
127. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 119, at 856–57, 875 (“Agencies that reap large financial
recoveries can develop reputations as strong and effective enforcers . . . .”); see also id. at 857
(“Money has two significant advantages over other forms of relief: it is easy to understand and easy
to quantify and compare. An agency can easily trumpet a ‘record’ financial judgment. It is far more
difficult for public enforcers to convey the importance or the scale of injunctive remedies.”); id. at
880 (pointing to “agencies commonly seek[ing] press coverage based on the large size of their
financial enforcement judgments” as evidence that they believe these figures enhance their
reputations).
128. See TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 144 (2000) (“people’s views of
themselves are linked to their views about the status of the groups to which they belong”); id. at 151
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frequently relied on the federal government’s (now suspended)
“equitable sharing” program whereby the federal government “adopts”
the seizure as a federal forfeiture and gives the state back approximately
eighty percent of the value to be used for law enforcement purposes. 129
These financial incentives are likely to skew enforcement priorities
toward forfeitable assets, and there is no reason to think that cases with
the most forfeitable assets will necessarily align with the public’s
enforcement interests. 130
Prosecutors also face cognitive biases that skew their decisionmaking
in ways that do not necessarily serve their clients’ interests well. 131
These cognitive biases are exacerbated by the amorphous nature of
prosecutors’ “do justice” mandate. 132 And their biases will tend to skew
toward those with whom they are naturally aligned: police and
victims. 133
This discussion is not meant to suggest that prosecutors are solely
self-interested rational actors who pursue only these objectives without
any consideration for the public interest. 134 To the contrary, my sense is
that most people who become prosecutors do so to serve the public. 135

(“Membership in a high-status group leads to a more favorable social identity and to higher feelings
of self-esteem and self-worth.”).
129. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 120, at 50–51; see also id. at 54 (“The profit and ease of
federal adoption has led to widespread circumvention of stricter state forfeiture laws.”); Letter from
M. Kendall Day, Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division, U.S.
Dept. of Justice (Dec. 21, 2015) (describing decision to “defer[] equitable sharing payments” to
address $1.2 billion reduction in appropriation for asset forfeiture), http://www.theiacp.org/
portals/0/documents/pdfs/RescissionImpactonEqutiableSharing122115.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXR3HMY8].
130. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 78–80 (2010).
131. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott,
The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006).
132. See Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 1639, 1660–61
(2015) (explaining that unclear facts or law amplify cognitive biases related to partisanship).
133. Green & Zacharias, supra note 8, at 863; Levine, supra note 95, at 1464–77 (describing
prosecutors’ self-interests in placating police because prosecutors need those same police offices to
win future cases).
134. See Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1516 (2008)
(“Prosecutors may maximize things other than their own wealth.”).
135. Id.; Bibas, supra note 112, at 443 (“If they were driven only by short-term monetary
considerations, most would have chosen more lucrative private-sector options. Many public-spirited
prosecutors want to do justice and serve as officers of the court . . . .”); Wright & Miller, supra note
112, at 1589 (“Prosecutors in many countries, including American prosecutors, pay careful attention
to the power that goes with their everyday decisions . . . . Most prosecutors, in our experience, are
conscientious public servants.”). Scholars treat class counsel’s motivations, at least in damages class
actions, as solely those of rational profit-maximizers. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3, at 677–84;
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Rather, the claim is that prosecutors’ self-interests play some role, even
if unintentional, in their broad discretionary decisionmaking that may
skew their decisions away from their public-clients’ best interests. 136
Although the sources of their self-interest are different, there is reason
to be concerned about lawyer self-interest and faithfulness to the clients’
interests for both class counsel and prosecutors.
D.

Who Cares About the Customers? 137

If the lawyer, rather than the client, has to make the critical decisions
in “clientless” litigation, why not just let the lawyer do what she wants
and ignore whether those decisions protect the client’s interests? For
legal ethicists, one answer is simply that lawyers are fiduciaries who
should do the best they can by their clients even when the clients are not
looking over their shoulders. But for those who do not share that
normative commitment, there are particular reasons in both prosecution
and class actions that make it important for lawyers to remain faithful to
their clients’ interests.
In criminal law, prosecutors are delegated the sovereign power to
determine who should be deprived of their liberty by choosing some or
all of the crimes listed on the broad and deep menu of charges that could
be levied against countless people. 138 Leaving extensive sovereign
power over citizens’ liberty to be exercised in whatever way an
individual prosecutor sees fit without meaningful checks on that
authority is troubling in a society undergirded by popular sovereignty. 139

Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 7–27. That seems reasonable in many but not all instances,
though a more detailed exploration of that notion is beyond the scope of this article.
136. See Bibas, supra note 112, at 443 (“I do not mean to suggest that prosecutors are moneygrubbing materialists who care only for the bottom line. . . . Nevertheless, economic considerations
cannot help but influence people, at least at the margins. Prosecutors, like everyone else, have
ordinary, human, material desires as well as civic-minded zeal.”).
137. Cf. CLERKS (View Askew Productions 1994) (“This job would be great if it wasn’t for the
[expletive] customers.”).
138. See Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty,
and the Limits of Law, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 391, 410–11 (2008) (“Decisions of prosecutors
are quintessentially sovereign acts in that they are moments when officials can decide who shall be
removed from the purview of the law.”); Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” is a
Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as a Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 646 (2006)
(noting “prosecutors’ vast discretion in selecting among elastic and redundant code provisions”);
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2548, 2549, 2560–62 (2004) (analogizing modern criminal codes to a menu off of which a
prosecutor may order).
139. Gold, supra note 3, at 84–87.
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The modern class action system depends on the mutual understanding
that the defendant and absent class members who do not opt out of the
litigation will be bound by the judgment. For the defendant, the
knowledge that preclusion will follow makes class actions an appealing
way to resolve mass disputes. 140 Due process prevents people from being
bound by litigation to which they were not a party except in a few
narrow instances, 141 such as a properly conducted class action in which
that person’s interests are adequately represented. 142 Thus, ensuring class
counsel’s fidelity to the class-client enables class actions to preclude
individual claims consistent with due process. 143
II.

MONITORING AGENTS

To keep these lawyers tethered to their clients’ interests even though
the diffuse clients cannot do so themselves, both systems employ some
monitoring scheme. But that is where the similarities end.
Part I explained that both class counsel and prosecutors are selfinterested lawyers with diffuse clients comprised of individuals whose
interests are amorphous and divergent. In each situation, because the
client’s interests are diffuse, there is no reason to expect that the
principal can monitor the agents directly. To address the potential
disconnect between the lawyer’s actions and the client’s interests in this
scenario, the typical approach is to look for a “superagent” 144 to monitor
the lawyer. And class action law uses superagents within the principal
group and a third-party superagent in the form of a judge, albeit not with
equal weight. 145 Interestingly, however, the approach to finding a
superagent to monitor agency costs or indeed whether superagency is the

140. See Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV.
287, 289 (2003) (“finality is what the settling defendant seeks to purchase in the transaction”);
Rave, supra note 77, at 1193–95 (explaining benefits to defendants of broad peace gained from
aggregate litigation).
141. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44–46 (1940).
142. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008); Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 44–46.
143. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 77, at 671 (“[Rule 23(a)(4)] tracks the Supreme Court’s pivotal
decision in Hansberry v. Lee, holding that due process of law is satisfied if the interests of absentees
are adequately represented.”); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Adequately Representing Groups, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3043, 3043 (2013) (describing “[a]dequate representation and preclusion” as “the
yin and yang of procedural due process”). This notion of adequate representation has been the
driving force behind the Supreme Court’s most important class action cases of the past two decades.
Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 578.
144. The term “superagent” was coined in Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing
Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999).
145. Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 3177–80.
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right approach diverges significantly between the two systems. And that
divergence offers interesting lessons that each system can learn from the
other.
Class actions rely primarily on judicial review to ensure class
counsel’s faithfulness to the class-client, informed by the potential input
of members of the class-client. 146 Criminal law shares the idea of input
from members of the client group by affording rights to victims, but it
turns largely to elections as a means of monitoring prosecutors and
forswears nearly all judicial review of prosecutors’ core decisions
regarding charging or plea negotiation. 147 In so doing, criminal law uses
a theoretically interesting mechanism of aggregation to evade the apathy
that voters feel as to particular cases in which they are neither a victim
nor a defendant and that do not draw significant media attention. This
mechanism does not work in practice, however, because of the massive
informational deficits that afflict prosecutor elections. 148 Accordingly,
criminal law scholars such as Rachel Barkow have looked to a different
source for a superagent: others in the agent’s organization. 149 Barkow
argues that structuring offices so that prosecutors check their colleagues
improves accountability. 150
A.

Class Actions

To address the potential disconnect between lawyers’ actions and
their clients’ interests in light of the widely recognized apathy of class
members, class action law relies heavily on judicial review.151 If a
damages class action is not resolved in the defendant’s favor on a

146. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002)
(describing the judge as a fiduciary for the class members); see also Issacharoff, supra note 7, at
3174 (“[T]he right of participation is directed not at the collective process of group decision making
but at the court, the arbiter of outcomes more than process as such.”).
147. E.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
148. Supra section II.B.
149. Barkow, supra note 14, at 895–911.
150. Id. at 895–906.
151. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884 (1987) (“The members of the
plaintiff class usually have very little capacity to monitor their agents.”); Nagareda, supra note 80,
at 902 (“The idea is that judicial review may substitute for the direct monitoring of counsel by the
client, as is typical in traditional litigation on behalf of an individual plaintiff.”); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 167
(2009) (“Judicial scrutiny over settlements is the most important safeguard against inadequate or
conflicted representation by class counsel.”).
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procedural motion but a class is certified, it will typically settle.152 Class
settlements can be approved only if a judge determines that the
procedural requirements for class certification are satisfied153 and
substantively that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” after
a hearing. 154 Some of these procedural requirements, though malleable,
are meant to protect the rights of the absent class members. A class
cannot be certified if the claims or defenses of the putative class
representatives do not align well with those of the absent class
members, 155 a requirement that seeks to ensure that flaws in the class
representatives’ claims are not held against the absent class members. 156
A class cannot be certified if its members have intractable conflicts of
interest. 157 A class cannot be certified unless the court finds that class
counsel will “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
class.” 158 Further, a class cannot be certified unless the number of
claimants is sufficiently numerous that individual joinder is
impracticable. 159
Several mechanisms allow subsets of the client to articulate their
views, but these processes are structured to inform judicial monitoring of
class counsel rather than as direct first-party monitoring mechanisms.
Class members are entitled to notice of proposed class certification and

152. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 812 (2010).
153. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620–21 (1997) (requiring that
certification of class action for purposes of settlement meet the same standards as certification of
class action for litigation purposes); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b).
154. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). Courts have expounded on these factors in a variety of different
ways, and the advisory committee has proposed a rule change to focus courts’ attention on the most
important of these considerations. See Memorandum from Hon. John D. Bates, Chair, Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure 3 (May 12, 2016), in Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Agenda Book, July 2016 at
253, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/committee-rules-practice-andprocedure-june-2016 [https://perma.cc/7AJ8-9VPE].
155. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
156. See, e.g., 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1764 (3d ed.
2016) (“Rule 23(a)(3) assures that the claims of the named plaintiffs are similar enough to the
claims of the class so that the representative will adequately represent them.”).
157. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625.
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4); see also id. at 23(g)(1) (requiring the court to appoint class
counsel).
159. Id. at 23(a)(1). There are other procedural hurdles to class certification, but they largely
serve to protect judicial economy or the defendant’s interest in finality. See id. at 23(a)(2)
(commonality); id. at (b)(3) (predominance and superiority).
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any settlement. 160 They may challenge the propriety of class certification
or object to the fairness of a settlement and seek to dissuade judicial
approval. 161 Class members may also opt out of the litigation,162 and
courts typically view large numbers of opt-outs as a red flag about a
settlement. 163 Named plaintiffs play a titular role in the case but
typically—like every other class member—have an insufficient stake in
its outcome to monitor class counsel. 164
Congress has tacked on a few more procedures in securities cases in
hopes of enlisting an interested victim to monitor her own lawyer but
again subject ultimately to judicial monitoring. The Court is required to
appoint the “most adequate plaintiff” as lead plaintiff to represent the
class. 165 The most adequate plaintiff then selects class counsel, subject to
judicial approval. 166 This process seeks to enlist a named plaintiff that
will meaningfully monitor its lawyer, though its success has been
roundly criticized. 167 In securities cases, the notice required for class
members about a proposed settlement must include a summary that
discloses the key terms. 168 This requirement allows for a somewhat
better opportunity for absent class members to understand the terms of
the proposed deal and thus informs the exercise of objection and opt-out
rights.

160. Id. 23(c)(2)(B), (e)(1). Notice requirements are different for other types of class actions, but
this article focuses on Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions.
161. Id. 23(e)(5).
162. Id. 23(c)(2)(B)(v); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs
and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1529, 1536 (2004) (explaining that the rights to opt out and object are typically seen as a check on
class counsel).
163. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 162, at 1537.
164. Leslie, supra note 86, at 1046 (“Neither does the named plaintiff serve as an adequate check
against self-dealing by class counsel.”); Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 5 (“The named plaintiff
does little—indeed, usually does nothing—to monitor the attorney in order to ensure that
representation is competent and zealous . . . .”).
165. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2012).
166. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
167. See, e.g., THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 415 (“[I]t is the
exceptional class action (not the rule) to find a lead plaintiff who has suffered a loss that would
financially support an individual suit, yet who prefers to prosecute a class action, taking on fiduciary
duties to others and incurring the delay and expense of all the attendant procedures.”); see also id.
(“The party who lost the most is not by that fact always the best party to control the case and control
the lawyers.”); Cox et. al., supra note 24, at 1602 (“[F]ew financial institutions seek to so involve
themselves, presumably because they do not see that the rewards of doing so are sufficient to offset
the cost of becoming involved.”).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(7).
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Congress also sought to enlist executive branch officials to object to
unfair settlements on their constituents’ behalf, but it did so only as a
means of informing judicial supervision. 169 For that reason, the parties
must notify relevant state and federal executive branch officials of the
terms of a class settlement in federal court. 170
Relying on judges informed through various sources is a reasonably
good option given the choices. But it certainly is not perfect. Class
settlement review suffers from several structural defects. American
judges are used to resolving disputes based on adversarial briefing, 171
and when a settlement is presented for review the attorneys have an
incentive to gloss over any weaknesses in either the class’s ability to
satisfy the Rule 23 prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality,
adequacy, predominance, superiority, or the substantive fairness of the
settlement. 172 Objectors can help raise valid concerns, but objectors are
not always present and may be driven by their lawyers’ financial
motivation to obstruct settlement rather than by a principled objection.
Despite efforts to provide information to judges, they nonetheless face
“a remarkable informational deficit.” 173 Judges also have self-interest in
approving settlements to clear complicated cases off their dockets. 174
And judges are conditioned in non-class contexts to view negotiated
resolutions of disputes as preferable to litigated ones. 175 Courts repeat
this same pro-settlement rhetoric when approving class settlements. 176

169. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2012); see Issacharoff, supra note
7, at 3179 (explaining intended effect of CAFA notice provision); Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views
of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1952 (2011) (same).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b).
171. Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1472.
172. See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 46.
173. Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1445; accord Issacharoff, supra note 18, at 808 (“Perhaps in
no other context do we find courts entering binding decrees with such a complete lack of access to
quality information and so completely dependent on the parties who have the most to gain from
favorable court action.”).
174. See Issacharoff, supra note 18, at 829; Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 45–46; Nagareda,
supra note 80, at 968; Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1445.
175. Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 46.
176. See, e.g., Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing
“strong judicial policy that favors settlements, particularly where complex class action litigation is
concerned”); In re PaineWebber Ltd. P’ships Litig., 147 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing a
“strong judicial policy in favor of settlements, particularly in the class action context”); Murillo v.
Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 921 F. Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“Settlements in class action cases
are encouraged and favored.”); see also Robin Effron, Co-Management and Co-Interpretation:
Reconceptualizing the Dynamics of Judges and Litigants in the Execution and Application of
Procedural Rules (Jan. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that courts
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Prosecution

In criminal prosecution, there are no effective case-by-case
monitoring mechanisms to facilitate review by anyone outside the
prosecutors’ office over the vast majority of prosecutors’ decisions. 177
Rather, the primary formal accountability mechanism is the ballot box:
most state and local lead prosecutors typically must stand for election
every few years. 178 The electoral check operates on lead prosecutors, and
administrative processes within the office check agency costs down the
line. 179 For federal prosecutors, the primary accountability mechanism
ties back somewhat detachedly through the administrative state to the
elected President. 180 Or at least, that is how the theory goes.181 Although
aggregating voters’ concerns in periodic election is a theoretically
interesting approach to evade the apathy problem, the political check on
elected prosecutors does not work well because voters lack sufficient
information about their prosecutors’ enforcement priorities. 182 Because
of the ineffectiveness of the electoral check, scholars have urged internal
review processes for prosecutors to provide meaningful input and check
each other. 183 These are useful in combatting predictable cognitive
biases, but they cannot avoid the problem of prosecutor self-interest in
career protection or career advancement.
defer to parties’ assessment of settlement fairness in class actions because of their inclinations to
defer to private procedural ordering more broadly).
177. Petit and grand juries do not perform this function well. See infra text accompanying notes
200–11.
178. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 100, at 581 (“[T]he public guards against abusive prosecutors
through direct democratic control. In the United States, we typically hold prosecutors accountable
for their discretionary choices by asking the lead prosecutor to stand for election from time to
time.”); id. at 589 (explaining that the vast majority of lead state and local prosecutors are elected).
179. Id. at 581. The actual structure of prosecutors’ offices varies significantly, including by how
hierarchical they are. Levine & Wright, supra note 14, at 1123.
180. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 46, at 190 (explaining that the distribution of authority
within the DOJ constrains discretion through supervisory oversight).
181. See Wright, supra note 100, at 582 (“There are reasons to believe that elections could lead
prosecutors to apply the criminal law according to public priorities and values . . . . Yet the reality of
prosecutor elections is not so encouraging.”); Wright & Miller, supra note 112, at 1606 (“In theory,
electoral control of prosecutors in the United States takes its most powerful form: Local control.”).
182. Bibas, supra note 6, at 987 (“Because elections are not driven by accurate general
assessments of incumbents’ performance, they do not solve the principal-agent problem.”); Gold,
supra note 3, at 78–79 (describing political check as ineffective because of voters’ lack of
information); Wright, supra note 9, at 593 (“[A]ny observer of prosecutor elections would have to
conclude that they do a poor job.”); Wright, supra note 100, at 582 (“[T]he reality of prosecutor
elections is not so encouraging.”); see also Barkow, supra note 14, at 871 (“[Prosecutors] have the
authority to take away liberty, yet they are often the final judges in their own cases.”).
183. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 14, at 895–906; Bibas, supra note 6, at 996–1015.
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The primary external accountability mechanism—prosecutor
elections—very rarely create meaningful accountability. 184 Prosecutorial
races are rarely contested: about eighty-five percent of prosecutor
incumbents run unopposed. 185 And incumbents who run are reelected
ninety-five percent of the time. 186 Widespread reelection and lack of
opposition could mean that ninety-five percent of prosecutors are doing
just as their constituents would wish. But I am skeptical. The vote share
that prosecutors receive does not correlate with either crime rates or
performance metrics. 187
Voters lack meaningful information about their prosecutors’
performance or their priorities in criminal law enforcement in the vast
majority of instances. Accordingly, neither reelection nor lack of
electoral opposition indicate meaningful alignment of priorities between
prosecutors and their constituents. 188 Potential challengers also lack
information about the incumbent’s performance, 189 so the lack of
opposition is hardly surprising. That lack of opposition in turn results in
the public having even less information because elections are when
candidates must make their cases to voters, albeit often in soundbite
form. 190 For these reasons, it is hard to see prosecutor elections as a
meaningful tool to promote democratic accountability in most instances.
Indeed, even when there is electoral competition, prosecutor election
campaigns nonetheless fail to facilitate a genuine assessment by the
184. See Bibas, supra note 6, at 987; Bruce A. Green & Alafair S. Burke, The Community
Prosecutor: Questions of Professional Discretion, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 315 (2012) (“As
scholars have previously noted, prosecutorial transparency increases public confidence in
prosecutors and courts and enhances the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Public elections
of prosecutors would be more reliable if the public were better informed about prosecutorial policies
and discretionary decision making.”).
185. Wright, supra note 100, at 593; Wright & Miller, supra note 112, at 1606.
186. Wright, supra note 100, at 592; Wright & Miller, supra note 112, at 1606. But cf. David
Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4–17) (on file with author) (analyzing a few recent, albeit rare
instances of incumbent prosecutors losing elections).
187. David Schleicher & Elina Treyger, The Case Against the DA 40–54 (Sept. 30, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
188. Bibas, supra note 6, at 983 (“Though in theory prosecutors serve the public interest, the
public cannot monitor whether they are in fact serving the public well . . . . Members of the public
have sparse and unreliable information about how well prosecutors perform.”); Gold, supra note 3,
at 78–79; see also Cassidy, supra note 3, at 1018 (“Prosecutors in the United States earn very low
grades for any kind of transparency, internal or external.”).
189. See Gold, supra note 3 (proposing mandatory disclosures of information to enable
meaningfully-contested prosecutor elections).
190. Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 3170 (explaining that Schumpeterian account of democracy
“necessarily entailed a competition for office by political elites”).
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voters of prosecutors’ preferences and policies because of the
information deficit. 191 Instead of a vigorous debate about enforcement
priorities or ideological differences, campaigns dwell on the outcome of
a few high visibility cases, 192 generic claims about personal integrity, 193
competence, 194 and conviction rates. 195 They rarely involve discussions
of office priorities, even in the simplified traditional election discourse.
Accordingly, even though the vast majority of lead prosecutors in
America are directly elected, those elections do not provide a
meaningful check on prosecutors.
Input from victims provides a sort of monitoring by a small sub-group
of the principal. 196 Just as class members are entitled to notice and the
right to be heard, 197 so too are crime victims. 198 But as with class
members, victim input is simply meant to inform the lawyer’s or judge’s
decision rather than to give victims final say. 199
Other mechanisms in criminal law ostensibly seek to hold prosecutors
accountable to their public-clients, but they do not work in practice

191. Bibas, supra note 6, at 961 (“District attorneys’ electoral contests are rarely measured
assessments of a prosecutor’s overall performance. At best, campaign issues boil down to boasts
about conviction rates, a few high-profile cases, and maybe a scandal.”); Levine & Wright, supra
note 14, at 1126 (“Prosecutorial elections are marked by heavy incumbency advantages and empty
rhetoric.”); Wright, supra note 100, at 605 (“In sum, the rhetoric of election campaigns puts too
much weight on the wrong criteria and completely ignores some criteria that could help voters make
meaningful judgments about the quality of a prosecutor’s work. Some of the most common themes
are downright silly.”). Several of Harry Connick’s campaigns for District Attorney in New Orleans
are a notable exception where election discourse addressed issues like the prevalence of plea
bargaining by prosecutors who were “lazy” and his efforts to dramatically reduce plea bargaining.
Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 61, 65
(2002).
192. Wright, supra note 100, at 582–83.
193. Id. at 602.
194. Wright & Miller, supra note 112, at 1606.
195. Id.
196. See supra section I.A; Bibas, supra note 113, at 953–55 (arguing that victims provide
important input for the insiders who run the criminal justice system).
197. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring notice to class members of certified class actions);
id. at (e)(1) (requiring that courts notify class members of proposed settlements); id. at (e)(2)
(requiring that courts hold hearings to evaluate settlement fairness); id. at (e)(5) (affording class
members the right to object to a proposed settlement).
198. See Justice for All Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) (2012) (affording victims the right to
notice of proceedings); id. § 3771(a)(4) (affording victims “the right to be reasonably heard”); id.
§ 3771(a)(9) (affording victims the right to be informed of plea bargains or deferred prosecution
agreements).
199. Green & Zacharias, supra note 8, at 861–62.
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either. 200 The grand jury interposes a subset of the public between the
prosecutor and criminal defendants as a prerequisite to any federal
felony prosecution and some state prosecutions. 201 In theory then, it
could provide a source of case-by-case monitoring by a subset of the
client to ensure that the prosecutor’s choices track the public-client’s
interests. 202 But modern grand jury procedure is not structured to do that,
at least in the vast majority of American jurisdictions. Prosecutors
dominate grand jury proceedings 203 and are rarely put through their
paces by evidence from the defendant or defense counsel.204 To top it all
off, grand juries are instructed that their role is to serve only as a
probable cause filter 205 and are not called upon to analyze whether
200. In a narrow range, constitutional criminal procedure such as Brady obligations or very
limited restrictions on use of evidence obtained through unlawful means could be seen as judges
checking prosecutor overreach. But disclosure and use of evidence encompasses only a narrow
subset of prosecutors’ decisions; judicial review does not reach questions of what crimes to charge
from amongst an array of options or what sentence to accept for the defendant in a plea agreement.
See, e.g., Wright, supra note 9, at 595. Moreover, Brady violations are common fare, see, e.g.,
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86
IOWA L. REV. 393, 431 (2001), and suppression is a tall order for all but the most egregious
constitutional violations, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of
Constitutional Remedies (Univ. Chi. Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 524),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584488 [https://perma.cc/6U3G-6ASR].
201. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (declining to incorporate the grand jury right against the states); 2
SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:2 (2d ed. 2005) (collecting sources
regarding scope of grand jury rights in the 50 states); Bibas, supra note 113, at 918 (“Grand and
petit juries empowered ordinary citizens to preserve their liberty, express their sense of justice, and
check agency costs and insiders’ self-interests.”).
202. See generally Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 319 (2012); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional
Design, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703 (2008).
203. Bibas, supra note 113, at 929; William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 174 (1973) (“[T]he grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor
who . . . can indict anybody, at any time, for almost anything . . . .”); Niki Kuckes, The Useful,
Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 29–33 (2004); Larry E.
Ribstein, Agents Prosecuting Agents, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 617, 635 (2011); see also Ric Simmons,
Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82
B.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2002) (describing current federal grand jury as “little more than a tool of the
prosecutor, unable to perform any meaningful function” and “impotent”).
204. See Bowers, supra note 202, at 344; Simmons, supra note 203, at 23–24. The wellpublicized Ferguson grand jury proceedings were quite unusual insofar as the prosecutors sought to
present a complete picture of the evidence. See Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104
GEO. L.J. 745, 745–46, 755–56, 766 (2016).
205. See Fairfax, supra note 202, at 761 (“An empaneling judge will typically charge the grand
jurors that if they find probable cause in a case, they should indict.”) (emphasis omitted); see
generally id. (arguing that the historical role of the grand jury was to broadly check the wisdom of
prosecution and not merely to serve as a probable cause filter).
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pursuing a criminal sanction serves the community’s interest in a
particular factual context. 206
The petit jury could in theory provide another conceivable way for a
subset of the client to check prosecutor overreach. 207 But the biggest
problem with that approach is that very few cases go to, or even
seriously contemplate trial.208 Thus, no petit jury is ever empaneled. 209
Nor does bargaining occur in trial’s shadow. 210 When substantive law is
broad and deep and carries severe penalties, the prospect of trying cases
is rarely a feasible one for the defendant or her already-overworked
counsel. 211
A guilty plea cannot resolve a criminal case unless a judge approves
it, but judicial review of guilty pleas is perfunctory and seeks only to
ensure that there is some factual basis for the plea and that the defendant
can say “yes” to each question in a colloquy. 212 And even at sentencing
judges may be constrained if the prosecutor has charged a sentencing
enhancement or mandatory minimum. 213
Because of the lack of external monitoring mechanisms, several
scholars argue that we should look within prosecutor offices for a source
of monitoring. 214 And indeed, internal monitoring is an essential
206. See Bowers, supra note 202 (proposing such a normative role for grand juries); Fairfax,
supra note 202, at 712–16 (categorizing types of “grand jury nullification”).
207. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?—Rethinking Sixth Amendment
Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 546 (1986) (“One function of the jury,
although not the only function, is to satisfy a community-centered interest in participation in the
justice system by injecting representative community voices and values into the decision process.”).
208. Bibas, supra note 113, at 930; Simmons, supra note 203, at 47.
209. Bibas, supra note 113, at 930; Simmons, supra note 203, at 47.
210. Bibas, supra note 113, at 930; Simmons, supra note 203, at 47.
211. See Stuntz, supra note 102, at 512–23.
212. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)–(2) (specifying requirements in federal court for ensuring that
the defendant’s plea is voluntary and that the defendant understands the rights she is waiving); Ion
Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39, 72–73 (2014)
(quoting typical plea colloquy by one magistrate judge in the Northern District of Iowa and using it
as an example of rote, surface level inquiry); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty,
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 20, 2014 (“[I]n practice, most judges, happy for their own reasons to
avoid a time-consuming trial, will barely question the defendant beyond the bare bones of his
assertion of guilt.”).
213. Bibas, supra note 6, at 971 (explaining that prosecutors have the “dominant role in setting
sentences” because of mandatory minimums and overlapping crimes); Richard A. Bierschbach &
Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8–9, 11 (2012) (describing
how prosecutors control sentencing outcomes through charging and charge bargaining); Cassidy,
supra note 3, at 1010–24 (making a similar point about state court prosecutors).
214. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 14 (advocating greater attention to supervision in federal
prosecutors’ offices and separation-of-function requirements that treat adjudication and enforcement
separately to be done by separate actors as a check on prosecutor overreach); Burke, supra note 131,
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component of any notion of accountability for federal prosecutors where
the electoral check is quite removed from the individual prosecutor. 215
For federal prosecutors, internal review is required in several instances
such as for decisions to seek the death penalty, subpoena a journalist,
seek waiver of corporate attorney-client privilege, or charge a case under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.216 The
existence of such internal processes in local prosecutors’ offices varies
considerably. 217 Opportunities for hierarchical supervision are limited in
many offices simply by their small size, 218 but that does not eliminate
the possibility of separating functions horizontally amongst prosecutors.
Even small offices can assign a prosecutor to screen and potentially
charge a case who is different than the one who helped police with an
investigation; 219 yet a third prosecutor could be assigned to plead out or
try the case.

at 1621 (proposing “fresh looks” at a file by prosecutors not already involved in cases); Cassidy,
supra note 3, at 1011 (“I propose an administrative check on prosecutorial discretion with respect to
charge bargaining of mandatory minimum penalties, and I lay the groundwork below for an internal
regulatory structure that may be refined and adopted by state prosecutors . . . .”); Findley & Scott,
supra note 131, at 388 (suggesting multiple levels of screening before charging as a check on
cognitive biases); Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision
and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2208 (2010) (advocating secondary,
internal review of charging decisions to counter predictable cognitive biases).
215. Green & Zacharias, supra note 46, at 190; see also id. at 197 (describing involvement of
centralized DOJ as most significant difference in office structure between federal and state
prosecutors); id. at 201 (“[D]ecision making by the chief prosecutor and those closest to him
promotes democratic ideals.”).
216. Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the
States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 525 (2011) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-10.040, 9-110.101, 9-110.300 to 9-110.400 (1997)); Green &
Zacharias, supra note 46, at 190; see also Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of
United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 402 & n.187 (2009) (explaining that United
States Attorneys Manual includes more than 200 provisions that require prior approval,
consultation, or notification to Main Justice).
217. Levine & Wright, supra note 14, at 1123, 1137, 1152 (studying one office that divides some
of its cases as between various stages of the adjudicatory process and another office in which
“prosecutors regard themselves as independent contractors” with no need to consult others about
their cases); Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 494 (2009) (“But it is likely that, despite what is
known about cognitive biases, prosecutors’ offices ordinarily refer new evidence to the trial
prosecutor who obtained the conviction if he is still in the office . . . .”); see ANGELA J. DAVIS,
ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 80 (2007) (explaining that
federal and some state prosecutors undergo significant internal processes before seeking the death
penalty).
218. Levine & Wright, supra note 14, at 1136.
219. Barkow, supra note 14, at 897–902.
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Accounting for Differences

Although these two systems raise similar concerns about
accountability of lawyers to their diffuse clients, they reach dramatically
different solutions as to how to hold the lawyers accountable. The
question naturally arises then whether the core differences between civil
and criminal systems, or the different nature of the divergence between
lawyer and client interests in the two systems, justify these rather
different approaches.
One significant difference between the systems, of course, is the
nature of the prosecutor’s work. 220 If someone must wield great
sovereign authority over citizens’ liberty, it seems sensible that this
person should be a public official accountable to the people. But of
course most prosecutors are not in fact elected, even if their bosses are.
Given this extraordinary power and the self-interested pressures that
tend to favor locking up more people, for longer, and with less
procedural fairness than seems to serve the public’s interest, the lack of
prosecutor accountability from external sources in the current system is
troubling. 221
Class counsel and prosecutors also face widely disparate playing
fields with different procedural hurdles checking their actions.
Prosecutors have tremendous procedural and resource advantages over
their opponents, whereas class counsel faces procedural disadvantages
vis-à-vis their adversaries. 222 Prosecutors’ financial resources vastly
outstrip their opponents’ in most cases. 223 Prosecutors also have an
investigative apparatus at their disposal, can offer incentives for
information such as freedom from criminal punishment, can ask a judge
to authorize forcible searches, can (usually successfully) urge a judge to
incarcerate the defendant while the case is pending, and can benefit from
marathon interrogations during which officers can lie or trick
suspects. 224 By contrast, if there is an imbalance in resources between

220. See Bruce A. Green, Ethics 2000 and Beyond: Reform or Professional Responsibility as
Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (detailing unique nature of prosecutors’ work).
221. Supra section II.B.
222. See Green, supra note 40, at 624–28 (describing prosecutors’ advantages).
223. See id. at 626; Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy
in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1590 (2005) (describing legislatures “consistently
underfunding defenders in order to constrain their effectiveness”).
224. See Green, supra note 40, at 626–33 (detailing prosecutors’ advantages including their
ability to have agents employ deception); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 59 (1991) (“[A] prosecutor
enjoys practical advantages over her adversaries [including] the state’s hefty investigative and
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corporate defendants and repeat-player plaintiffs’ class action lawyers,
the corporate defendant is likely to be better resourced. 225 Class counsel
faces the procedural hurdles of numerosity, commonality, typicality,
adequacy, predominance, and superiority to get a class certified as well
as demonstrating that any settlement is fair, 226 all of which require
supporting evidence before she can favorably resolve her case. 227 In
sum, there are already plenty of hurdles that tend to prevent class
counsel from overreaching on the client’s behalf, or at least doing so
successfully. But there are not analogous checks on prosecutorial
overreach. 228
Preclusion is another difference between the class action and criminal
prosecution, though it is less important than it may seem at first glance.
Although prosecutions are brought formally in the name of the people or
the State, no victim’s legal rights are impaired or their claims
extinguished. The difference is less important than it seems for several
reasons: first, there is somewhat of an analog to preclusion in criminal
law insofar as the same sovereign cannot bring a subsequent case on the
same charges if jeopardy has attached in the first case. 229 And even
though precluding a subsequent criminal case does not extinguish any
victims’ rights to private relief, it may frustrate their wishes for the
public accountability and stigma of a criminal conviction. Second, to the
extent that class members want to preserve their own right to litigate,

litigation resources.”); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A
Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 210 (2006) (“State funding for defense investigations is
also too limited.”).
225. But see Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1494,
1519 (2013) (“[T]he plaintiff class (despite its internal flaws) can stand on equal footing with an
organizational defendant with the same capacity to pursue a lawsuit.”); Issacharoff, supra note 76,
at 716 (“The modern plaintiffs’ mass harm bar has evolved to counter the repeat-play advantage that
institutional defendants enjoy with regard to any individual claimant.”).
226. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(3), (e).
227. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011).
228. Class counsel is (at least theoretically) subject to malpractice liability whereas prosecutors
have absolute immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–31 (1976) (holding that
prosecutors have absolute liability from civil suits for their work initiating a prosecution and
presenting their cases). Malpractice suits against class counsel are basically a nonstarter though, so
this difference is not a meaningful one in practice. There is, however, at least one recent case in
which a defendant pursued plaintiff’s counsel for civil RICO liability. See Briana Lyn Rosenbaum,
The RICO Trend in Class Action Warfare, 102 IOWA L. REV. 165 (2016) (discussing CSX Transp.,
Inc. v. Gilkison, No. 05-cv-00202-FPS-JES, 2013 WL 85253 (N.D. W.Va. Jan. 7, 2013) and the
desirability of using RICO to regulate class counsel).
229. U.S. CONST. amend V. Double jeopardy also bars future charges on lesser-included offenses.
See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977).

07 - Gold.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

3/21/2017 2:59 PM

“CLIENTLESS” LAWYERS

125

they can opt out of any damages class action. 230 Finally, many classaction claims are not worth very much and indeed are worth less
individually than they would cost to litigate.231 Such “negative value”
suits do not pose a choice between individual cases or a class action but
rather between a class action and no litigation, so the class action is not
typically precluding anything otherwise practically valuable. 232 Thus,
although extinguishing individual claims might seem like a weighty
difference between the two systems at first glance, it actually poses less
of a concern in practice. These differences in the nature of the two
systems suggest that the need for accountability is more compelling in
criminal prosecution because of the weighty consequences, but they do
not suggest that the approaches to accountability in the two contexts
should be completely different.
The concerns about the nature of the misalignment between lawyer
and client interests also differs between the two contexts. Class
counsel’s self-interests are direct financial interests that raise concerns
about under-reach. 233 Their firms front the costs of litigation and get paid
only if they obtain a judgment (either after settlement or trial). Thus,
scholars fear that class counsel will under-reach and settle cases for too
little to ensure a payday, and that bearing the costs of litigation will tend
to induce risk aversion. 234
Prosecutors’ self-interests are largely not financial, and they tend to
raise concerns not of under-reach but of overreach. 235 Prosecutors’ selfinterests cut in favor of preserving a high conviction rate, avoiding highprofile losses, and efficiently using their resources to lock up
criminals. 236 These results help protect electoral success where the boss

230. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).
231. Courts have become increasingly skeptical of class actions that seem viable if litigated
individually on the basis that class actions are not a superior method of adjudication. Jay Tidmarsh,
Living in CAFA’s World, 32 REV. LITIG. 691, 692 (2013); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)
(superiority requirement).
232. See, e.g., Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. ACT, Inc., 798 F.3d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 982 (2016) (“The principal intended beneficiaries of [the class action] are persons
who have suffered small but similar losses as a result of wrongful conduct by the same defendant or
defendants. . . . For such persons, it will often make little practical sense for any one of them to
bring a claim only for herself . . . .”).
233. See supra section I.C.1.
234. See Leslie, supra note 86.
235. See supra section I.C.2.
236. Bibas, supra note 113, at 913; Brown, supra note 49, at 194–207; Stuntz, supra note 102, at
535–37; Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 67, at 1399.
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is directly elected (as in most state systems) and facilitate future career
options in elected office or the private sector. 237
The self-interests in class actions are financial and tend toward underreach while the self-interests in criminal prosecution are largely careerdriven and tend toward overreach. This difference is important to
account for when analyzing what we can learn from the comparison, but
it does not justify completely different treatment of lawyer
accountability in the two systems, as the next section explains in more
detail.
III. IMPLICATIONS
These differences in monitoring regimes between the two systems
offer important lessons that civil and criminal procedure scholars can
learn from each other in the search for lawyer accountability to the sort
of diffuse clients described above. 238 The lesson from criminal law
scholars about looking internally within the agent’s organization to
improve accountability can be incorporated into class action law in some
respects. 239
Prodded by the ineffectiveness of external constraints on prosecutorial
discretion, criminal law scholars have turned to internal administrative
processes within prosecutors’ offices in the search for an effective
monitoring scheme. 240 Scholars have turned to second opinions,
supervision, and other checking mechanisms within prosecutors’ offices
to restrain the extent to which cognitive biases steer prosecutors away
from their public-client’s best interests. 241 The problem these scholars
rightly seek to combat is that prosecutors who investigate a case are then
in a poor position to make a detached, neutral decision about the
defendant’s guilt or deserts. 242 Barkow advocates for assigning
237. Stuntz, supra note 102, at 535 (“To some degree, line prosecutors will seek to [maximize
political support] too, because that is their bosses’ goal, and they must satisfy their bosses in order
to keep their jobs.”).
238. Cf. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 12, at 683 (“This is a plea for comparative work in civil
and criminal procedure.”); see generally William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation:
Lessons from Habeas, 82 NYU L. REV. 790 (2007) (comparing class action law to habeas corpus
litigation); Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 67 (drawing on class action law as a basis for
suggesting reform to mass criminal restitutionary proceedings).
239. I address elsewhere the lessons that criminal law can learn from class actions about
accountability. See Gold, supra note 12.
240. Supra section II.B.
241. Barkow, supra note 14, at 873.
242. Id. at 883; see also, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 803 (2003) (“[P]rosecutors who have helped call the shots in
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investigative and adjudicative responsibilities to different prosecutors in
each case in United States Attorney’s offices and involving at least one
supervisor in each adjudicative decision because supervisors will have
practical expertise and a less myopic perspective due to their
longevity. 243 A panel of decision-makers would be better still, she
explains, to check biases that even experienced prosecutors hold. 244
Other scholars have persuasively advocated a second opinion or “fresh
look” from a prosecutor not involved in the case who would be less
affected by tunnel vision and confirmation biases. 245 Anticipating this
check by a second prosecutor would help debias the first prosecutor. 246
Fresh look could be combined with an adversarial process by allowing
both the investigating attorney and defense counsel to present their cases
to the fresh-look prosecutor. 247 For instance, the Department of Justice’s
Capital Case Unit allows arguments from defense attorneys when
considering whether to seek the death penalty. 248
In class actions, scholars have widely recognized that judicial
monitoring is imperfect, and a similar turn to internal checks within the
plaintiffs’ bar in addition to the existing accountability regime could
help restrain class counsel and bolster the existing external check of
judicial review. This internal checking could occur within plaintiffs’
class action firms, amongst plaintiffs’ firms, or between third-party
litigation funders and class counsel. Checking within firms is most
analogous to the criminal law scholarship, but the other approaches
share some degree of similarity insofar as they look for monitoring from
those affiliated with the agent in some capacity and may hold greater
promise in class action law as a practical matter.

an investigation will be hard pressed to retain their magisterial perspective not just about the tactics
used in the investigation, but about whether charges should be pursued thereafter.”); Uviller, supra
note 99, at 1716.
243. Barkow, supra note 14, at 903–04.
244. Id. at 904.
245. Burke, supra note 131, at 1621 (proposing “fresh looks” at a file by prosecutors not already
involved in cases); Findley & Scott, supra note 131, at 388 (suggesting multiple levels of screening
before charging as a check on cognitive biases); Medwed, supra note 214, at 2208 (advocating
secondary, internal review of charging decisions to counter predictable cognitive biases).
246. DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 26, 182 (2012).
247. Barkow, supra note 14, at 905; see also Lynch, supra note 48, at 2147–49 (recommending
allowing defense counsel to present her case to the prosecutor); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint
of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1565 (1981) (proposing a similar process).
248. DAVIS, supra note 217, at 80.
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The basic similarity between all of the models proposed in criminal
law is the need to consult colleagues and gain internal approval for
critical decisions. Similarly, class action lawyers involved in negotiating
a settlement could be encouraged to gain approval from colleagues or
co-counsel before presenting the settlement to a court. 249 If a third party
such as a hedge fund is funding the litigation, class counsel may in fact
be required to seek approval before presenting the settlement to a court.
Class action plaintiffs’ lawyers seek to maximize their firms’ profits
to some extent, but they are only human. As with prosecutors who were
involved in an investigation, the lawyers directly involved in negotiating
a settlement will be the least capable of neutrally assessing how well it
serves the class-client’s interests. These lawyers might overvalue their
own performance and the deal they secured. Or, for lawyers whose
compensation does not depend directly on the settlement such as
associates or non-equity partners in a larger firm, they might be
particularly tempted to steer a case toward settlement to improve their
compensation or promotion opportunities if they are nearing a yearend. 250
A.

Monitoring Within Firms

To address these concerns about tunnel vision or individual financial
or career-driven interest within the firm, encouraging lead attorneys on a
case to present the merits of the settlement to their financially interested
colleagues in some capacity will have a debiasing effect and provide a
more detached check on class counsel’s under-reach. 251

249. As a practical matter, this can work only if class counsel’s firm or group of firms has a
sufficient number of lawyers not directly working on the case to check those who are. That
condition will not always hold, but sometimes it will. See Ratner, supra note 88, at 774 (“[L]arger
firms have in fact come to dominate the plaintiffs’ class action bar.”); id. at 779 (describing smaller
firms forming ad hoc coalitions for individual cases that form the equivalent of a complex, larger
firm).
250. Id. at 786–88 (describing incentives for gamesmanship near the end of a year for
compensation and promotion purposes).
251. Adversarial biases and individual lawyers’ initial decision to pursue the case could lead to
overconfidence in its merits and thus a higher bottom line in settlement negotiation, and a similar
effect might result if success in each case redounds to the individual lawyers more than does failure.
See id. at 790–91. In these scenarios, the internal check could be structured to encourage the lawyers
working on the case to accept a settlement proposal rather than continuing to litigate. But the
incentive working in that direction to check settlement obstinacy within firms already exists because
of colleagues wanting to get paid, so no judicial prod is necessary.
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Private Actors

Class action plaintiffs’ firms could designate a particularly
experienced partner to review class settlements. 252 Assigning the same
partner to this role in case after case would allow her to build expertise
and take the role seriously, 253 though she might also come to be viewed
internally with the same warm embrace as internal affairs officers in
police departments. Firms could alternatively establish a committee of
lawyers with varying levels of experience for such review. 254 Lastly,
they may wish to designate one or more of their lawyers to serve as
devil’s advocate in a quasi-adjudicative internal proceeding. Such a
process would parallel what many lawyers do when testing arguments
before a mock jury and the adversarial processes that some scholars
describe within prosecutors’ offices. 255 For any of these methods, a
double-blind approach would help prevent personal relationships from
skewing the analysis.
These different structures of internal review are listed in the previous
paragraph in order of increasing cost. Whether the more costly structures
(or indeed any internal review structure) are worth the benefit should be
left to each firm individually to assess in each case. I am not suggesting
mandating formal review within private law firms. Rather, I suggest that
courts should create incentives for firms to consider internal processes.
A firm can then employ whatever processes it sees as most efficient in
each case.
Very little complex litigation scholarship discusses any such internal
checks within firms. 256 But Ratner’s recent work analyzing the structure

252. See Barkow, supra note 14, at 903–04 (explaining the benefits of expertise in conducting the
adjudicative prosecutorial function).
253. See id. at 904–05 (suggesting that prosecutor’s offices create a separate group of
adjudicators who can develop a culture of taking this task seriously).
254. Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm Partners as Their Brothers’ Keepers, 96 KY. L.J. 231, 270
(2007) (explaining that “[p]artners find the [substantive] evaluation of peers[’ work] ‘much less
palatable than the rather commonplace practice of reviewing associates’” (quoting Harry H.
Schneider, Jr., Your Partner’s Keeper, 1993 A.B.A. J. 104, 104 (Nov. 1993)); see also Barkow,
supra note 14, at 904 (explaining why multiple people with different levels of experience would add
value to internal process).
255. See Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1453–55, 1475–77 (suggesting appointment of devil’s
advocate to improve judicial class settlement fairness review); Barkow, supra note 14, at 905.
256. Cf. Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical
Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 290 (1997) (finding
based on empirical study of Texas law firms with ten or more attorneys that only ten percent of
respondents have formal procedure to evaluate how partners handle client matters but that thirtyfour percent of respondents had an individual or committee tasked with such evaluation);
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of plaintiffs’ class action firms and its effect on individual lawyers’
incentives alludes to the idea that structural complexity of a plaintiffs’
class action firm may already help facilitate internal accountability in
some measure. 257 In a large firm, each partner’s income will not
typically turn solely (and perhaps not even predominately) on the
financial success of the cases she manages because her equity stake
more likely depends on factors, such as seniority, that are independent of
results in her own cases, Ratner explains. 258
In firms where equity is dispersed in the manner that Ratner
describes, 259 each partner already has some incentive to monitor others’
cases with the strength of that incentive varying based on a rough
estimate of each case’s value. 260 Attorney’s fees are typically awarded as
a percentage of the settlement amount, 261 so proportionally small
differences in the total settlement value on which the fee is based may
translate into real money for the firm in large-dollar cases. Thus, under
such a firm structure, partners who are not emotionally invested in a case
have some (albeit imperfect) incentive to ensure that their colleagues do
not sell out the class’s interests. As with lawyers working on the case,
these partners face opportunity costs as to their colleagues’ time, and so
too do these partners bear a share of any unreimbursed costs. Thus, the
difference in emotional investment between partners working on a case
and those who are not seems greater than the difference in financial
interests. But the point remains that intrafirm accountability measures
already exist, to at least some extent in firms with dispersed equity that
do not work on an eat-what-you-kill model.
2.

How Public Actors Could Facilitate

To facilitate these checks, judges could predictably and transparently
reduce attorney’s fee awards to class counsel from what they would have
otherwise awarded if one or more previously-proposed settlements in the

Richmond, supra note 254, at 271 (explaining as to law firms generally that “few firms attempt to
evaluate partners’ substantive performance in their practice areas”).
257. See Ratner, supra note 88, at 821.
258. Id. at 786, 795.
259. Ratner’s work does not empirically study plaintiffs’ law firms’ equity-sharing models but
discusses law firm structure based on his own experience. Id. at 780–96. A detailed analysis of
whether indeed equity is widely dispersed amongst partners or whether most plaintiffs’ firms
operate on an “eat what you kill basis” where each partner profits primarily from their own cases
would be useful.
260. See id. at 801 (explaining very rough ability to estimate anticipated fees).
261. Fitzpatrick, supra note 152, at 832.
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case have been rejected as unfair or if class counsel has not delivered
sufficient value for the class. Determining the amount of a fee award is
within judges’ broad discretion and should be structured to get the
incentive system right for class counsel. 262 Some courts may already
take this approach implicitly, 263 but if so, the transparency and
predictability are missing. 264 Under such a regime, lawyers with an
equity stake in a plaintiffs’ class action firm who are not directly
working on a particular case would have an incentive to monitor the
settlements that are actually proposed to the court themselves or set up a
process to facilitate such review, at least if the anticipated fee were large.
Their financial incentive would be approximately the same as the
partners working on the case (though perhaps scaled because of varying
numbers of shares), but they would not have the same emotional
investments or bases for tunnel vision. Firms might adopt internal rules
regarding procedures to be used given particular dollar amount triggers
in settlement value. Mechanically, this change in fees law could come
about through common law evolution or through altering the sub-section
of Rule 23 that governs fee awards. 265 Because predictability is
important to structuring incentives, a rule change would be preferable.
A second and related way to encourage internal monitoring of class
counsel is to increase the costs of having a settlement rejected as unfair
by requiring that judges consider class counsel’s individual track record
and her firm’s track record. 266 This idea borrows loosely from voters
262. See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 50 (“The trial court’s broad discretion to determine
the amount of the fee award gives the judge enormous potential leverage with plaintiffs’ counsel to
control the conduct of the litigation and to deter conduct by plaintiffs’ counsel that the trial court
dislikes.”).
263. By way of a possible example, in a privacy class action against Facebook in which the
district court first rejected a proposed settlement on fairness grounds before approving a revised
settlement, the court reduced class counsel’s fee from the requested amount. See Order Granting in
Part Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Incentive Awards, Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp.
2d 785 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013) (No. C 11-1726 RS) [hereinafter Fee Order, Fraley]. If we take
the court at its word, however, the fees awarded were lower than requested because of the way
injunctive relief was used in the fees motion as a basis for the award; the reduction ostensibly had
nothing to do with the initially rejected settlement. Id.
264. Although there is some very useful empirical work on attorney’s fee award practices in class
actions, see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action
Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010); Fitzpatrick, supra note 152, I am
not aware of any work exploring the relationship between fee awards and whether settlements were
approved as first proposed.
265. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
266. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield
Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 646 (2008) (describing consideration of the firm’s track record in
prior settlements in determining adequacy of representation as a “more dramatic innovation[]”). But
see NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22:79 (4th ed.) (explaining current standard that “counsel’s

07 - Gold.docx (Do Not Delete)

132

3/21/2017 2:59 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:87

having a basic statistic about conviction rates when voting for their
prosecutor. 267 If courts knew what percentage of class counsel’s (and her
firm’s) previously proposed class settlements had been rejected, they
could use spotty track records as indicia of reason for concern about the
settlement. Because proposed settlements are not frequently rejected or
even modified, 268 that record would be underinclusive. Accordingly,
courts should also consider whether lead counsel’s fee requests in
previous class actions were reduced based on problems with the
underlying settlement. 269 Reducing a fee request rather than rejecting a
settlement allows judges to penalize class counsel for less than stellar
performance while nonetheless clearing the docket and assuring the
class’s recovery. 270 Thus, considering fee awards would help combat the
false negatives of looking only to rejected settlements. Fee award
opinions do not typically cite performance issues as the basis for a
smaller award than requested, but knowing that the opinion could be put
to future use might encourage judges to do so. Analysis of previous fee
requests should be limited solely to individuals proposed as class
counsel rather than across the firms involved. Although that limitation
increases the potential for gamesmanship in deciding which individuals
‘track record’ [is not] relevant to a determination of adequacy of representation” (citing Cohen v.
Long Island Lighting Co., No. CV–84–0588 (LDW), 1986 WL 9961 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 1986)). A
class certification motion may propose numerous people and firms as class counsel to benefit from
the combined expertise for purposes of demonstrating their adequacy. See, e.g., Pls.’ Mot. for Class
Certification at 43, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C-012252 MJJ). (“Plaintiffs retained a coalition of three not-for-profit organizations and three private
law firms each of which, standing on its own, possesses substantial experience in litigating
employment discrimination cases; collectively they are more than qualified to serve as class
counsel.”). In that instance, so too is it reasonable for a court to factor each’s track record into its
analysis.
267. Wright & Miller, supra note 112, at 1606. In the prosecution context, the conviction rate
statistic is largely meaningless, id.; Bibas, supra note 112, at 442, but its analog could be helpful in
class actions.
268. See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 35 (1996) (finding that eighty-six percent of
settlements were approved by district courts without changes).
269. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 264, at 270 (analyzing the number of fee requests
granted as proposed). When resolving fee award requests, courts must explain their findings and
legal conclusions on the record or in writing. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h)(3), 52(a)(1). Notice must also be
given to class members who are afforded a right to object. Id. at 23(h)(1)–(2). Fee awards that are
granted in an amount lower than requested because the court rejects the methodology underlying the
calculation, see, e.g., Fee Order, Fraley, supra note 263, are not the sorts of modifications that
would signal anything useful about class counsel’s performance for future cases.
270. Refusing to certify a class may also clear the court’s docket, but it is far less certain. Class
counsel might react by folding, settling the named plaintiffs’ claims individually, and abandoning
the class claims. But they may instead propose a revised class or seek new discovery to support a
subsequent motion.
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to propose as class counsel, a contrary proposal under which courts had
to analyze every fee request that anyone in class counsel’s firm had ever
submitted that was not approved in full would be unwieldy. 271
Moreover, considering fee requests and awards may beneficially make
class counsel more cautious ex ante when making such requests—a
moment at which class counsel and the class’s interests are at odds. 272
Assuming the concerns about track record are not great enough to
defeat adequacy entirely—which they could be in some instances—
courts could ratchet up their scrutiny of settlement fairness 273 or appoint
an advocate to argue against the settlement.274 In some cases, the court
could simply refuse to approve the settlement. Another possibility would
be auctioning the claims to the highest bidder with the existing
settlement as a reserve price, though auctions have not gained traction in
class action practice despite scholars’ persuasive arguments in their
favor. 275
As a practical matter, settlement review is deferential in part because
of judges’ docket management incentives.276 Even if courts had the
institutional capacity to investigate settlements or they had a court
investigator to help, 277 courts might nonetheless have too little
bandwidth to carefully scrutinize the results of all of those
investigations. 278 If judges could focus their efforts on cases where class
counsel’s track record caused concern, that limiting factor would make
searching review more feasible. Of course this would not eliminate

271. That conclusion seems likely even though most fee requests in class actions are approved in
full. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 264, at 270.
272. Macey & Miller, supra note 151, at 196–202. This statement assumes, as is true in many
class actions, fees awarded as a percentage of the recovery. Fitzpatrick, supra note 152, at 831–32.
273. See Macey & Miller, supra note 151 (suggesting varying standards of scrutiny for class
settlement approval based on nature of settlement akin to standards of scrutiny in constitutional
law); cf. David S. Han, Rethinking Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1135 (2014) (arguing
that courts should not take an all-or-nothing approach to conflicts between First Amendment
interests and tort liability but rather use intermediate approaches that limit damages).
274. Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1452–55.
275. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 105–18; Jay Tidmarsh, Auctioning Class
Settlements, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 227, 230–31, 241–42 (2014).
276. See Issacharoff, supra note 18, at 829; Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 45–46; Nagareda,
supra note 80, at 968; Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1445.
277. See Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1461–62, 1477–81 (proposing class action investigation
office to investigate procedural details of settlement negotiations to facilitate judicial review for
fairness).
278. Cf. Huq, supra note 200 (arguing that limits on judicial capacity have led to skewing
substantive standards in the Fourth Amendment and other contexts to focus on fault as a
gatekeeping mechanism to limit caseloads).
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judges’ incentives to approve the settlement to clear their dockets, but a
meaningful way to prioritize might reduce those pressures.
Rather than refusing to certify a class or rejecting a proposed
settlement entirely, judges could approve a settlement but transparently
reduce the attorney’s fee from what they would otherwise award if the
more stringent review yielded concerns about class counsel’s
performance in the particular case.279
Fear that a rejected or weak settlement could cascade into losing
claims to other bidders, more stringent review, failed attempts at class
certification across the firm, or predictably reduced fees across the firm
would provide a stronger incentive for internal monitoring within class
counsel’s firm than would simply scaling fees in the particular case. As a
practical matter, settlement (and an ensuing fee award) is plaintiffs’
counsel’s desired outcome in damages class actions. Anything that
would make future settlement approvals and therefore future paydays
more difficult or less valuable would impose a substantial cost on class
counsel and her equity-holding colleagues.
Track records of settlement approval would be a slightly noisy signal,
and I am not suggesting that one rejected settlement should prevent all
future settlements by that firm or lawyer. Rather than indicating a
meaningful problem, in some instances, rejected settlements could result
from an overly stringent trial judge, a particular jurisdiction with active
circuit courts conducting interlocutory review of class certification, 280
cases drawing greater-than-usual public attention, 281 or perhaps
settlement with an intractable defendant in a case where going to trial
would not serve the class well. But because docket-management
pressures give district judges a reason to be too generous in settlement
approvals, 282 a settlement that a judge rejects as not “fair, reasonable,
and adequate” 283 tends to meaningfully indicate that class counsel
actually got her class-client a raw deal. Or to put it differently, false

279. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (providing judges control over attorney’s fee awards).
280. See, e.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 778 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.); Eubank v.
Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.).
281. When the largest-ever employment discrimination class was certified against the world’s
largest private employer, the case led to two levels of circuit court review with three different
majority opinions, and then Supreme Court review. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th
Cir. 2007), vacated, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 603 F.3d
571, rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
282. Issacharoff, supra note 18, at 829; Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1445; Redish, supra note
29, at 104.
283. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
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positives are far more likely than false negatives; negatives will thus
tend to be meaningful signals. 284
Monitoring previous performance at the level of the firm is meant to
encourage internal checking and make these data less manipulable. If
one lawyer in a firm has a settlement rejected, it would be easy enough
to just take her name off of future class settlements so long as a
colleague also has sufficient experience. There is of course still some
room to game the process, including lawyers moving to other firms,
which is why the data point of the particular lawyers’ performance is
also important.
To the extent that an internal check such as review by a colleague or
funder prevents class counsel from accepting a lowball settlement offer
that she would otherwise accept, the internal check has provided an
effective substitute for the client. That result might seem inefficient
insofar as it adds process costs, but it should add value for the classclient. 285 In that instance, class counsel can mimic a tactic already
available to defense counsel and well known to negotiators—blaming
the client for tying her hands and for the resulting refusal. 286 The
defendant might then make a higher settlement offer in hopes of
attaining complete peace through the class device. 287
One cost of the proposal to consider the firm’s track record during
settlement approval is that it would encourage class counsel to find the
most favorable possible forum in which to file so as to prevent any black
marks on her firm’s record, but class counsel already has an incentive to
forum shop. At least when choosing among fora where venue lies and

284. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05 cmt. g (2010) (“A track
record of success can be at most a necessary condition for appointment to the class-counsel post, not
a sufficient one.”).
285. See Brooke Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777 (2015) (urging a
reimagining of the efficiency norm in civil procedure to account for benefits and not simply to
equate efficiency with low cost).
286. See Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models:
Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA L. REV. 811, 854–55
(1987) (explaining that lawyers can use this sort of client-based argument defensively when
rejecting opposing counsel’s settlement offer, including specifically to justify a competitive tactic of
refusing a settlement offer while preserving the cordiality of the relationship between opposing
lawyers). Although a lawyer’s colleagues do not have final say on a settlement the way that clients
do in ordinary litigation, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983), they
may be harder to convince to accede to a settlement offer than a non-lawyer client.
287. See Rave, supra note 77, at 1186 (discussing benefit to defendants of complete peace in nonclass aggregate litigation).
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there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant, why wouldn’t class
counsel seek out the one most likely to lead to a favorable result? 288
This proposal creates only a stick that can make plaintiffs’ lawyers’
lives harder or less profitable without a corresponding carrot. That may
discourage some socially valuable lawsuits, at least at the margins. I tend
to think that judges will be fairly restrained in their use of track records
to avoid that result. But to the extent that this approach does undercut
valuable suits, one possible approach would be to increase attorney’s
fees when firms use well-structured internal administrative processes. A
simpler approach would be increasing fees across the board as a
percentage of recovery and using that increased fee range as a
benchmark for any performance-based deductions. The choice between
the two schemes depends largely on whether one thinks that fees are too
low now 289 and how feasible it would be for courts to determine when
firms have used meaningful internal administrative processes.
B.

Monitoring Across Plaintiffs’ Firms

When class actions are brought by a coalition of law firms rather than
a single firm, similar opportunities for monitoring exist within the
coalition. 290 The split of the eventual attorney’s fee award between the
firms is not a forgone conclusion; the court ultimately decides that
split. 291 Anticipating competition over the ultimate fee award among the
members of the plaintiffs’ coalition, 292 each firm thus has an incentive to
criticize others’ lack of effort or results to build a record for the fees
motion. 293
In some instances, lawyers’ interests in joining coalitions in future
cases could tend to encourage them to go along without objection in
deals that they think less than stellar to protect their future portfolios, as
288. See Aaron Simowitz, A U.S. Perspective on Forum Shopping, Ethical Obligations, and
International Commercial Arbitration, in FORUM SHOPPING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION CONTEXT (Franco Ferrari, ed., 2013) (arguing that plaintiffs’ lawyers have a duty to
forum shop to protect their clients).
289. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 62 (arguing that attorney’s fees are too low in class actions and
advocating that all recovery in small-claim cases go to attorneys).
290. Cf. Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 159–69 (proposing inter-firm monitoring in non-class
aggregate litigation).
291. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:23 (5th ed.).
292. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1273, 1289–90 (2012) (describing skirmish between firms over allocation of fees in
nonclass aggregate litigation).
293. Cf. Silver & Miller, supra note 2, at 141 (describing “a messy process in which
lawyers . . . compete for shares of a limited fund” of attorneys’ fees in multidistrict litigation).
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Elizabeth Burch recognizes in multidistrict litigation practice.294 Burch’s
proposal for courts to appoint multiple, cognitively diverse leadership
committees in non-class aggregate litigation helps address this concern
in class actions too. 295 Courts should also favor appointing multiple,
cognitively diverse firms to represent the class. Such appointments may
help combat concerns that the plaintiffs’ firms may seek to advance their
long-term cooperation interest over their short-term financial gain. 296
Moreover, several scholars have usefully proposed harnessing
competitive forces within the plaintiffs’ bar as a means to help
encourage class counsel to serve their clients’ interests. Jonathan Macey
and Geoff Miller proposed an auction in which the winning bidder
would purchase the class’s claims and pay the amount of her bid to be
distributed to the victims. 297 The winning bidder could then pursue the
claims herself with both ownership and control. 298 One potential bidder
would be another plaintiffs’ firm, 299 which fits the paradigm of interfirm
accountability mechanisms. Most recently, Jay Tidmarsh suggested that
courts conduct auctions when a class settlement is proposed using the
settlement value as the reserve price.300 Then another plaintiffs’ firm
could outbid that settlement amount to pursue the claim. 301 These
auction proposals provide one more potential tool to improve
accountability in class actions by facilitating accountability within the
plaintiffs’ bar—albeit using a tool that requires more work from courts
and thus faces some practical hurdles.
C.

Monitoring by Third-Party Funders

Lastly, when lawsuits are funded by third parties such as hedge funds,
those funders can provide a highly interested monitor and reduce the
extent to which class counsel may not represent her class-client’s
294. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 94
(2015) (explaining concerns about relying on consensus in multidistrict litigation committee
appointment because attorneys “may silence themselves out of concern that they will be ostracized
and thus ineligible for future leadership positions”).
295. Id. at 120.
296. See id. at 85–101.
297. Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 105–18.
298. Id. It is the separation of ownership and control that gives rise to the agency costs that class
action scholars discuss at length. See, e.g., id.
299. Id.
300. Tidmarsh, supra note 275, at 241–45.
301. As with Macey and Miller’s proposal, there are other potential bidders in Tidmarsh’s auction
proposal such as third-party funders, but those sorts of bidders will be addressed below. See infra
section III.C.
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interests. 302 Third-party funding can remove the internal conflict that
comes from class counsel being both funder and lawyer and diminish the
risk aversion that scenario generates. If the agreement between funder
and lawyer provided for an attorney’s fee based on billable hours plus a
small contingency bonus, lawyer and funder would tend to check each
other in a way that redounds to the class’s benefit. 303 The lawyer would
tend to want to work more hours, while the funder would want the most
relief per hour expended. Moreover, if class counsel wishes to recruit
third-party funders in future cases, their reputational concerns become
far more important than would typically be the case for lawyers such as
class counsel who don’t need clients to hire them. 304 Class counsel has to
worry about reputational concerns to some extent to secure judicial
settlement approval, but judges enter the picture with a case already on
their dockets with an incentive to clear that docket. Third-party funders
can simply decline to work with potential class counsel because of
concerns about class counsel’s reputation without any counterweight
similar to docket management pressure. Third-party funders operate in a
similar role to the auction winners that some scholars have suggested to
address accountability concerns between class counsel and the classclient. 305 They play a somewhat similar role to plaintiffs’ management
committees in multidistrict litigation comprised of lawyers with large
inventories of clients. Both have a large financial stake in selecting and
monitoring other attorneys who conduct common benefit work. 306
Courts’ role in facilitating this check by third-party funders is to get
doctrine out of its way. If these third-party funding arrangements sound
like champerty and maintenance, that is because they are. Champerty
and maintenance are historical prohibitions on supporting another’s
lawsuit that remain in effect, to some extent, in many jurisdictions.307
302. See Burch, supra note 292; Issacharoff, supra note 6. This idea of a large stakeholder as
monitor also animated the most adequate plaintiff provisions of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2012);
supra note 167 (recounting criticisms of that approach in securities law).
303. Burch, supra note 292, at 1278, 1316–17; Coffee, supra note 7, at 342.
304. Burch, supra note 292, at 1312–15 (describing third-party funders as “hiring” or funding
lawyers with good reputations).
305. See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 105–18; Tidmarsh, supra note 275, at 230, 238 &
n.43 (describing similarities between auction mechanism and third-party funding for agent
monitoring).
306. See Silver & Miller, supra note 2; id. at 169–70 (explaining that their proposal would align
the management committee’s interests with those of all plaintiffs).
307. Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 98–99, 99 n.162 (2011)
(listing jurisdictions that permit some measure of champerty); see also Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd.
P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000) (“[P]ut simply, ‘maintenance’ is helping another prosecute
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“[A]ll fifty-one jurisdictions permit at least one form of maintenance: the
contingency fee.” 308 Thus, the first step in some jurisdictions to facilitate
third-party funders as a check on class counsel is simply eliminating
prohibitions on champerty and maintenance beyond allowing
contingency-fee suits. 309 Not only should litigation funding be permitted,
but to achieve a meaningful monitoring role, third-party litigation
funders should be empowered to control the litigation as the client
otherwise would. 310 Communications between lawyers and potential
funders also need to be dependably cloaked in attorney-client privilege
and work product protection to allow for free and open communication
and successful vetting of claims. 311
* * *
None of these internal accountability mechanisms is perfect—nor is
the existing regime of judges monitoring class counsel. But facilitating
multiple overlapping mechanisms in addition to the existing regime of
judicial control can improve accountability. 312
The internal structures for class actions suggested here are designed to
target not the complaint-filing decision as would be most analogous to
prosecutor internal review of a charging decision but rather the class
settlement. The difference in timing between this proposal and the
criminal law scholarship comes from important differences in the two
systems. In criminal law, the charging process is hugely important,
whereas the filing of a class complaint is far less momentous. In criminal
law, charging a case in certain ways can give the government massive
leverage to induce a plea and substantially affect the possible resulting
sentence, including controlling decades of a defendant’s liberty in a way
that makes “blackmail settlements” and “hydraulic pressure” in class

a suit; ‘champerty’ is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome”);
Champerty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“an agreement to divide litigation
proceeds between the owner of the litigated claim and a party unrelated to the lawsuit who supports
or helps enforce the claim”); Maintenance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Improper
assistance in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit given to a litigant by someone who has no bona fide
interest in the case; meddling in someone else’s litigation.”).
308. Sebok, supra note 307, at 99.
309. Burch, supra note 292, at 1326–28.
310. See Jack L. Millman, Note, Structuring a Legal Claims Market to Optimize Deterrence, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 496, 501–21 (2016).
311. Burch, supra note 292, at 1327–28 (collecting sources regarding common-interest doctrine
in privilege law).
312. Cf. Zachary Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285 (2016)
(arguing that redundancy shouldn’t always be treated as a four-letter word and explaining the
benefit of combining public and private enforcement).
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actions 313 seem like child’s play. 314 Harsh mandatory minimums and
sentencing enhancements that may be invoked at prosecutors’ discretion
mean that prosecutors’ charging decisions substantially affect
sentencing. 315 Prosecutors can induce defendants 316 into waiving rights
by creating an immense sentencing differential between convictions after
a plea versus trial such that trial becomes far too risky. 317 The most
famous example is Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 318 The prosecutor indicated
on the record that he intended to recommend a five-year sentence for

313. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299–300 (7th Cir. 1995)
(describing so-called “blackmail settlement” concern); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 164
(3d Cir. 2001) (describing “hydraulic pressure” to settle). But see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to
Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (arguing that none of
the various iterations of the blackmail settlement narrative are persuasive).
314. See Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice,
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 324 (2009); Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Shadow of Advisory Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 377,
384–85 (2010); Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 87, 88 (2003) (“The profusion of new narcotics and gun proscriptions, almost all of which
carry mandatory minimum prison sentences, transformed the traditional prosecutorial power to
charge into the contemporary prosecutorial power to determine the length of the sentence the
defendant will serve.”).
315. See Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists, supra note 314, at 330 (“[S]entencing
enhancements create a largely charge-based system in which prosecutorial decisions determine the
sentence.”); see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1976) (describing that in some of the systems the author observed, “the task of
sentencing in guilty-plea cases had been transferred from the courts to the District Attorney’s
office.”); Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
61, 63 (2015) (“By selecting the charges, prosecutors strongly influence the sentence. This is so
even where mandatory minimum sentences are not implicated because the advisory Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are influential in plea bargaining and sentencing.”); Rakoff, supra note 212
(“In actuality, our criminal justice system is almost exclusively a system of plea bargaining,
negotiated behind closed doors and with no judicial oversight. The outcome is very largely
determined by the prosecutor alone.”).
316. See Susan R. Klein, Enhancing The Judicial Role In Criminal Plea And Sentence
Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2037–38 (2006) (describing various “clubs” that prosecutors
possess in plea bargaining); United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (2013) (describing
sentencing enhancements as “produc[ing] the sentencing equivalent of a two-by-four to the
forehead”); Rakoff, supra note 212 (describing weapons with which prosecutors can “bludgeon
defendants into effectively coerced plea bargains”).
317. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (“To coerce guilty pleas, and sometimes to coerce cooperation
as well, prosecutors routinely threaten ultra-harsh, enhanced mandatory sentences that no one—not
even the prosecutors themselves—thinks are appropriate.”); id. (“The government’s use of [prior
felony informations] coerces guilty pleas and produces sentences so excessively severe they take
your breath away.”); Bibas, supra note 6, at 971 (“Courts find no problem even when prosecutors
use coercive sentencing differentials as plea bargaining leverage.”).
318. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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Hayes’s eighty-eight-dollar forgery if he pleaded guilty. 319 When he
refused to plead guilty, the prosecutor charged him instead as a habitual
criminal, which led to Hayes’s mandatory life sentence. 320 Of course the
possibility of trial can serve as a theoretical check on this behavior, but
substantive criminal law is so broad and deep that this check is
exceptionally weak. 321
By contrast, a civil complaint can be amended and superseded, and it
has no great weight on the force of any settlement discussions except
insofar as it provides basic notice to the defendant of the claims and the
proposed scope of the class. 322 Moreover, the class-client’s rights can be
affected only when a class is certified, 323 and the complaint itself
precedes any certification order. If class certification is eventually
sought without a concurrent settlement proposal, 324 the court will also
have the benefit of a defendant’s brief arguing against certification. In
cases where a settlement is not proposed immediately, class counsel and
defense counsel will often negotiate at arm’s length over a settlement,
whereas criminal defense counsel may not do anything that would look
to civil lawyers like bargaining. 325
Relatedly, we expect a resource disparity in criminal law; to the
extent we can expect a resource disparity in class actions, the disparity is
inverted. In one system (criminal) the better-resourced actor initiates the
case, 326 and in the other (class action) the weaker actor (class counsel, if
there is a weaker actor) files. 327 Accordingly, internal checks in criminal

319. Id. at 358–59.
320. Id.
321. See Stuntz, supra note 102, at 512–23.
322. The binary decision of whether to file a complaint certainly affects potential settlement.
323. See, e.g., Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013); Smith v. Bayer
Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 314–15 (2011).
324. The timing is not uniform from case to case. The complaint can be filed concurrently with a
proposed settlement and motion for class certification; the complaint can precede a joint filing of a
motion for class certification and settlement approval; or the complaint, motion for class
certification, and motion for settlement approval can all be filed consecutively.
325. Jenny Roberts & Ronald Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1445,
1483–87 (2016) (finding based on empirical study that public defenders in their sample largely did
not strategically deploy anchoring in plea negotiation by rarely making first offers and rarely
making low or “very favorable” offers); id. at 1485–87 (finding that defense attorneys “usually” but
did not “always” counter a prosecutor’s offer and that the defendant accepts the prosecutors’ first
offer “sometimes”).
326. See Green, supra note 40, at 626 (“[O]ne can scarcely question the underlying
premise . . . that ordinarily prosecutors have far greater power than their adversaries.”); Ion Meyn,
The Lightness of the Prosecutor’s Burden 23–24 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
327. But see Lahav, supra note 225, at 1519; see also Issacharoff, supra note 76, at 716.
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law are designed to begin checking overreach right from the outset of a
case. In contrast, the internal check in class actions is less necessary at
the filing stage where the more powerful actor is not yet even
involved. 328 Rather, the need for monitoring would not be implicated
until there is reason to be concerned that class counsel may under-reach
so as not to continue litigating against a better-resourced defendant.
Because of these differences, internal processes in criminal law are very
important at the charging stage, whereas internal processes for class
counsel make more sense at settlement than in the initial phases of claim
investigation or complaint drafting. 329
CONCLUSION
Unlike in the traditional paradigm of client-controlled representation,
class counsel and criminal prosecutors have no client actively
controlling the litigation. These lawyers’ diffuse entity-clients have
amorphous and complicated interests, and the lawyers themselves have
self-interests that tend to diverge from their clients’ interests. Both
scenarios therefore create serious accountability concerns.
Nonetheless, class actions and criminal prosecution turn to
dramatically different approaches to monitor lawyers when they are
making client-like decisions. In the settlement context, class actions rely
on judges to ensure that class counsel has reached a deal that is fair to
her client, while criminal law turns to elections and internal
administrative processes. Accountability in class actions would improve
by adding some form of criminal law’s internal accountability regime.
More specifically, courts should create an incentive for class
counsel’s colleagues to monitor proposed class settlements to ensure that
the class-clients’ interests are being well served. That incentive could
come from predictably reducing attorney’s fee awards for poor
performance. Or it could be greater still if class certification or
settlement approval were linked in some measure to putative class
counsel’s firm’s track record and her individual track record in previous
cases. So too does this comparison illuminate the notion that
accountability within the plaintiffs’ bar can come from one firm

328. Plaintiffs’ firms can use internal checks before deciding whether to invest resources to
pursue a case, but the need for such checks to protect class members is not terribly compelling at
that early stage.
329. That said, I am not suggesting that any process be mandated for class counsel, so each firm
can make its own choices as to timing.
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monitoring another or potentially from third-party funders monitoring
class counsel, where such third-party funding exists.
In addition to the direct implications of the comparison for improving
accountability in class actions, the comparison reveals ways in which
criminal law can learn from class actions. 330 It also yields broader
insights about “clientless” lawyers’ motivations, how “clientless”
lawyers are publicly perceived, and the mismatch of lawyer and client
interests. This article seeks to explain why the comparison is fruitful and
draw out the direct implications for ways in which class action law can
learn from criminal prosecution. Lessons that we can learn about
accountability in criminal law and the broader implications and
discussions of other “clientless” contexts must be left for another day.

330. The lessons that class action law affords to accountability in criminal law are addressed
elsewhere. See Gold, supra note 12.

